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 Twenty-five years ago, in Avery v Midland County,' the
 United States Supreme Court extended the one person/one vote
 requirement to local governments. Avery and subsequent decisions
 applying federal constitutional standards to local elections2 sug-
 gested a change in the legal status of local governments and ap-
 peared to signal a shift in the balance of federalism. Traditionally,
 local governments have been conceptualized as instrumentalities of
 the states.3 Questions of local government organization and struc-
 ture were reserved to the plenary discretion of the states with little
 federal constitutional oversight.4 In contrast, Avery assumed that
 local governments are locally representative bodies, not simply
 arms of the states. Avery and its progeny, therefore, imposed new
 restrictions on state provisions for the organization of local govern-
 ments. Commentators have expressed concern that rigid applica-
 tion of federal constitutional principles could deprive states and
 localities of the flexibility essential to make local governments re-
 sponsive to the tremendous diversity of local conditions.6
 Has local government structure been federalized by constitu-
 tional protection of the right to vote in local elections? Has the
 t Professor of Law, Columbia University. My work for this Article was supported by
 the research fund of the Columbia Law School alumni.
 l 390 US 474 (1968).
 See, for example, Kramer v Union Free School District No. 15, 395 US 621 (1969);
 Cipriano v City of Houma, 395 US 701 (1969); Hadley v Junior College District of Metro-
 politan Kansas City, 397 US 50 (1970); City of Phoenix v Kolodziejski, 399 US 204 (1970);
 Hill v Stone, 421 US 289 (1975).
 3 See, for example, Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv L Rev 1057
 (1980).
 4 Hunter v City of Pittsburgh, 207 US 161 (1907), best exemplifies this traditional
 position.
 6 See, for example, Tom C. Clark, Symposium-One Man-One Vote and Local Govern-
 ment: Introduction, 36 Geo Wash L Rev 689 (1968); Comment, The Impact of Voter Equal-
 ity on the Representational Structures of Local Government, 39 U Chi L Rev 639, 639
 (1972) ("the majority of commentators now believe that the voter equality requirement is a
 significant obstacle to the effective functioning of many existing forms of local government
 and the creation of regional governments"); Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners
 Associations, 130 U Pa L Rev 1519 (1982).
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 model of local governments as locally representative democracies
 supplanted the traditional view of local governments as adminis-
 trative arms of the state? Certainly, one person/one vote has had a
 direct impact on many localities. In just the last few years, lawsuits
 premised on the one person/one vote principle have resulted in the
 invalidation of New York City's Board of Estimate,6 Chicago's
 school decentralization plan,7 the regional government of the Seat-
 tle metropolitan area,8 and the funding mechanism for Southern
 California's rapid transit system.9 Furthermore, hundreds of other
 localities now engage in the decennial redrawing of district lines
 and the consequent alteration of local political power. In each in-
 stance, the extension of the franchise or the enforcement of the
 requirement that votes be equally weighted brings local electoral
 practices into compliance with the norms of representative democ-
 racy that the Supreme Court has mandated for state legislatures.
 Nevertheless, the effect of Avery on the balance of federal and
 state power in determining local government structure and on the
 conceptualization of local government has been less certain and
 more complex than these publicized cases suggest. The Supreme
 Court has circumscribed the reach of federal constitutional con-
 cern, effectively exempting many local governments and many cat-
 egories of local elections from strict judicial scrutiny. The federali-
 zation of local election law has been partial, and the states retain
 considerable control over the organization and structure of local
 governments.
 This Article considers the scope of federal constitutional pro-
 tection of the right to vote at the local level. It examines the diffi-
 culties inherent in strictly applying the notion that an equally
 weighted vote is central to representative government-an idea
 that emerged from judicial review of the relatively simple legisla-
 tive arrangements of our national and state governments-to the
 byzantine set of institutions known as American local government.
 * Board of Estimate of City of New York v Morris, 489 US 688 (1989). See text accom-
 panying notes 242-48.
 7 Fumarolo v Chicago Board of Education, 142 Ill 2d 54, 566 NE2d 1283 (1990). See
 text accompanying notes 126-31. See generally John M. Evans, Let Our Parents Run: Re-
 moving the Judicial Barriers for Parental Governance of Local Schools, 19 Hastings Const
 L Q 963 (1992).
 8 Cunningham v Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 751 F Supp 885 (W D Wash
 1990). See notes 131 and 256 and text accompanying note 258.
 9 Southern California Rapid Transit District v Bolen, 269 Cal Rptr 147 (Cal App
 1990). This decision was ultimately reversed in Southern California Rapid Transit District
 v Bolen, 1 Cal 4th 654, 3 Cal Rptr 2d 843, 822 P2d 875 (1992) (en banc). See text accompa-
 nying notes 150-65.
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 Local government is strikingly different from other levels of gov-
 ernment, and not simply because local governments are territori-
 ally smaller. Local government organization does not abide by the
 "plain vanilla" model10 characteristic of state or federal govern-
 ment: a single legislative body with general lawmaking powers over
 a broad jurisdiction with democratic accountability to the residents
 of that jurisdiction. Instead, specialization, fragmentation, overlap,
 and boundary change are pervasive characteristics of our local gov-
 ernment structure, and they raise considerable conceptual difficul-
 ties for resolving questions of representation at the local level.
 Local governments are often thought of as little democracies,
 providing fora for participation, deliberation and collective action
 concerning a wide range of policy matters. But local governments
 perform other functions as well. Many thousands of local govern-
 ments are functionally specialized, limited to providing a particu-
 lar service or improvement to a discrete subset of the community.
 The state effort to give special or exclusive representation in the
 governance of these local units to a constituency limited to fee
 payors or service recipients conflicts with a view of the locality,
 modelled on the upper levels of government, as simply a small
 state, democratically responsible to the territorial jurisdiction as a
 whole.
 Local governments vary in scale, ranging from the neighbor-
 hood to the metropolitan region. The large number of overlapping
 localities in fragmented metropolitan areas often results in local
 governments affecting areas beyond their borders, and having dif-
 ferent degrees of impact on residents within their borders, to an
 extent far greater than at the state or national level. It is difficult
 to match jurisdiction and constituency precisely, or to assure that
 all members of the constituency have the same degree of interest
 in a particular local government. Claims that particular groups are
 over- or underrepresented raise knotty problems of determining
 exactly what a fair representation of groups differentially affected
 by a particular local government ought to be.
 The plasticity of local boundaries presents further questions.
 Local governments are regularly created, subjected to territorial or
 10 "Plain vanilla" comes from Professor Carol Rose's criticism of the use of the federal
 Constitution as the standard-or "plain vanilla"-model of a constitution as a basis for
 critiquing other constitutions. See Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the Feder-
 alist Empire: Anti-Federalism from the Attack on "Monarchism" to Modern Localism, 84
 Nw U L Rev 74 (1989). I would echo but modify her criticism to reflect the fact that, in
 considering questions of government structure, both state legislatures and Congress are
 often accorded "plain vanilla" status.
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 functional modification, combined with other localities, or carved
 out of pre-existing local entities.1" Who is to participate in deci-
 sions concerning local boundary changes? If local residents are
 given an electoral role, how ought their votes be counted: as the
 votes of individuals in the electorate of the entire area or as the
 votes of members of existing communities within the area? There
 is simply no analogue concerning representation in questions of
 boundary change at the state or national level.
 The fundamental premise of federal voting rights law is that
 democratic government means government by consent of the gov-
 erned. As the Supreme Court observed in Wesberry v Sanders,
 " [n]o right is more precious in a free country than that of having a
 voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as
 good citizens, we must live."1'2 In its voting cases, the Court has
 presumed a close nexus of residency within a jurisdiction, the im-
 pact of that jurisdiction's government on residents, and the right
 to equal representation in the jurisdiction's elections and govern-
 ment. But due to the variety of local powers and the complexity of
 local structures, the effects of local government actions, even on
 residents, are not a simple binary matter of "impact/no-impact."
 Local institutional arrangements focusing on service delivery or in-
 frastructure finance, providing for extraterritorial regulation, or
 authorizing boundary changes raise difficult questions concerning
 what it means to govern and who is governed by a local decision.
 In local government cases, the Court has struggled with the rela-
 tionship between jurisdiction and impact and the implications of
 this relationship for voting rights-particularly where a local gov-
 ernment has sharply different degrees of impact on differently sit-
 uated residents within its borders.
 A rigid application of the federal constitutional standard for
 the protection of the franchise to all local elections could have re-
 sulted in close judicial scrutiny of a wide variety of institutional
 arrangements central to local government but alien to the state or
 federal experience. Instead, the Supreme Court limited constitu-
 tional concern to the local government issues comparable to those
 found at the state and national levels-the ongoing governance of
 general purpose governments. Boundary change, extraterritorial
 authority, and many special districts, have been defined as largely
 11 See, for example, Joel C. Miller, Municipal Annexation and Boundary Change, in
 International City Management Association, The Municipal Year Book 1986 72 (ICMA,
 1986).
 12 Wesberry v Sanders, 376 US 1, 17 (1964).
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 outside the scope of constitutional protection. This has limited the
 impact of one person/one vote on many traditional state-author-
 ized local arrangements, preserving considerable flexibility for
 state regulation of governance at the local level. In so doing, how-
 ever, the Court has been unable to develop a consistent analysis of
 how differential government impact should affect voting rights and
 representation. Rather, the Court has pursued a two-track ap-
 proach. For one set of local votes, the Court has presumed that all
 residents are comparably affected by local government actions, has
 strictly scrutinized deviations from one person/one vote, and has
 rigidly enforced the federal norm of equal representation. In the
 other, the Court has applied a much less stringent standard, has
 deferred to state claims that a locality has sufficiently different de-
 grees of impact on those subject to its actions to justify exclusions
 from the franchise, and has denied that voting rights have been
 abridged. The encounter between one person/one vote and Ameri-
 can local governments thus tells us something about both the un-
 certain conceptual underpinnings of our dominant conception of
 representation and the multiple roles local governments play in
 American life.
 This Article has four parts. Part I examines Avery v Midland
 County and the other Supreme Court cases that extend federal
 constitutional protection of the right to vote to local elections.
 These cases develop and implement the model of local democracy
 in its core area-general purpose governments.
 Part II considers the Supreme Court's treatment of some local
 governments as more akin to private enterprises, and, therefore,
 exempt from the rule of local democracy. The distinction benefits
 only landowners, and not other groups with special interests in the
 quality of particular local services. The lack of a clear principle for
 determining which governments are "proprietary" and which are
 "governmental" has, at times, made the distinction difficult to ap-
 ply. Further, the uncertain scope of the proprietary district excep-
 tion has validated a legal framework in which important public
 functions may be broken away from general purpose governments
 and vested in special units not subject to local democratic control.
 Part III addresses the questions of representation raised by
 extraterritoriality, boundary changes, and overlapping govern-
 ments. Although these issues often involve general purpose govern-
 ments subject to one person/one vote, the courts have not consid-
 ered themselves strictly bound to the democratic model. Instead,
 the notion of local government as state instrumentality, carrying
 out the state's police and general welfare functions at the local
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 level, retains vitality in this setting. In these cases, constitutional
 protection of the right to vote has been accommodated to the state
 power to create local governments and to define and alter their ju-
 risdictions and political constituencies.
 Part IV considers subunit representation in local governments
 of regional scope. A central thrust of one person/one vote is the
 definition of "representation" in terms of population. This may be
 an obstacle to the formation of regional governments because small
 localities might refuse to join a regional entity unless they are
 guaranteed their own distinct voice-larger than their population
 might warrant-in the resulting area-wide government.13 More-
 over, citizen understanding of and participation in government
 decisionmaking may be enhanced where regional government dis-
 tricts are coterminous with community or neighborhood lines, even
 where neighborhoods differ in population.14 It is difficult to deter-
 mine whether the equal population rule has, in fact, obstructed the
 formation of metropolitan area governments, because few such
 governments were considered either before or after Avery. The lo-
 cal aversion to regional government has been sufficiently great that
 it is difficult to conclude that one person/one vote alone is respon-
 sible for the lack of movement towards regional government. Nev-
 ertheless, a doctrine flexible enough to accommodate landowner-
 ship-based governments and considerable state discretion in the
 allocation of the franchise in boundary changes or instances of
 overlapping governments has been far more rigid in its refusal to
 recognize the possibility of distinctive political subdivision inter-
 ests in regional elective local governments. Today's metropolitan
 areas face political, economic and social problems that transcend
 local boundaries. There is a growing need for representative gov-
 ernance structures with the capacity and perspective to address is-
 sues of regional scope, while maintaining local units that can con-
 tinue to focus on matters of community or neighborhood
 significance. Thus, I will suggest the need for a fourth model of
 local government-regional federation-to supplement the existing
 models of local government as local democracy, proprietary enter-
 13 See, for example, Avery, 390 US at 493-94 (Harlan dissenting); Robert G. Dixon, Jr.,
 Rebuilding the Urban Political System: Some Heresies Concerning Citizen Participation,
 Community Action, Metros, and One Man-One Vote, 58 Georgetown L J 955, 974-84 (1970).
 14 See, for example, Joseph P. Viteritti, The New Charter: Will It Make a Difference?,
 in Jewel Bellush and Dick Netzer, eds, Urban Politics New York Style 413, 426 (M.E.
 Sharpe, 1990) (discussing lack of coterminality between community service districts and city
 council districts).
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 prise, and state agency in order to comprehend fully the variety of
 roles local governments can play in the American political system.
 The Conclusion offers some brief observations concerning the
 insights into both the organization of local government law and the
 conceptual underpinnings of the one person/one vote doctrine
 gained from examining the application of one person/one vote to
 local governments. The difficulties of applying the one person/one
 vote doctrine to local governments illuminate the multiple func-
 tions and sometimes conflicting conceptions of local government at
 work in our system and raise questions about the place of the one
 person/one vote doctrine itself as a bedrock norm in our theory of
 representation.
 I. ONE PERSON/ONE VOTE AND THE MODEL OF LOCAL DEMOCRACY
 In a series of cases in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Su-
 preme Court subjected local governments to the same constitu-
 tional standards of representation and enfranchisement as the
 states. The Court required representation on local government
 bodies to comply with one person/one vote and subjected restric-
 tions on the local franchise to exacting judicial scrutiny, sustaining
 them only if necessary to further a compelling state interest. In
 developing the model of local democracy, the Court steered away
 from the dizzying variety of local elections and refused to allow the
 states to give greater representation to groups the states deemed
 primarily interested in a particular government's actions. Instead,
 the Court emphasized the extent to which a local government's ac-
 tions affect the people of the jurisdiction as a whole rather than
 any subset of the community; it gave an expansive definition of the
 sort of interest in local government action that could be the basis
 of an adult resident's claim to the local franchise; and it treated
 the state's decision to fill an office or make a decision through a
 local election as creating a strong presumption in favor of partici-
 pation in the election by the entire local electorate.
 A. Avery v Midland County and General Purpose Governments
 The Court began the extension of one person/one vote to local
 governments in 1968, four years after it had first developed the
 principle in the context of elections to state legislatures1" and the
 15 Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533 (1964). See also Gray v Sanders, 372 US 368 (1963)
 (applying one person/one vote to a county unit system of counting votes for party primary
 elections of United States Senators and other statewide officers).
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 House of Representatives.16 In Avery v Midland County,17 the
 Court examined the Commissioners Court of Midland County,
 Texas, which had been districted to enable a tiny rural minority to
 elect a majority of the body's members."8 Three arguments might
 have preserved this arrangement: that local governments are not
 covered by the equal population principle at all; that even if some
 local governments are subject to one person/one vote, the commis-
 sioners court is not a legislative body and, therefore, is exempt
 from the rule; and that even if federal constitutional standards for
 representative bodies apply to the commissioners court, the state
 could bias the districting in favor of rural residents because the
 county's primary function is to provide services and regulation for
 rural areas.
 16 Wesberry, 376 US 1.
 17 390 US 474 (1968). In 1967, the Supreme Court had considered four cases that raised
 districting questions within local governments, but "refused to meet the issue squarely."
 Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Local Representation: Constitutional Mandates and Apportionment
 Options, 36 Geo Wash L Rev 693, 697 (1968). Two of these cases, Moody v Flowers and
 Board of Supervisors v Bianchi, were dismissed together on jurisdictional grounds. 387 US
 97 (1967). In the other two cases, Sailors v Board of Education of Kent County, 387 US 105
 (1967), and Dusch v Davis, 387 US 112 (1967), the Court "reserved the question whether the
 apportionment of municipal or county legislative agencies is governed by Reynolds v. Sims,"
 Dusch, 387 US at 114, but then "assume[d] arguendo" that Reynolds did apply to local
 elections, Sailors, 387 US at 109, 111; Dusch, 387 US at 114, and found that the representa-
 tion systems challenged in the two cases were not unconstitutional. Sailors concerned a
 Michigan system for selecting members of a county school board that the Court deemed
 "basically appointive rather than elective." 387 US at 109. Dusch involved elections to a
 local council in which all council members were elected at large, but some were required to
 be residents of territorial subunits that varied widely in population. The Court found that
 the subunits were "'merely [ ] the basis of residence for candidates, not for voting or repre-
 sentation,'" 387 US at 115, quoting Fortson v Dorsey, 379 US 433, 438 (1965); thus, there
 was no one person/one vote problem.
 18 The Commissioners Court was composed of five members. One, the County Judge,
 was elected at large from the entire county and in practice cast a vote only to break a tie.
 The other four were commissioners elected from districts. One district, consisting of the city
 of Midland, had a population of 67,906. The other three districts had a total population of
 2094. 390 US at 476.
 The Texas Constitution provided for the division of the counties of Texas "into four
 commissioners precincts" for the election of commissioners but did not provide that dis-
 tricts be of equal population. Avery v Midland County, 406 SW2d 422, 425 (Tex 1966)
 (quoting Tex Const, Art V, ? 18). The Avery trial court had found that the Midland County
 apportionment had been adopted "for political expediency, to maintain the status quo" and
 reflected "a gross abuse of . . . discretion" by the commissioners court. Id at 424-25 (quoting
 trial court findings). The trial court invalidated the apportionment. Id. The Texas Supreme
 Court agreed that the apportionment was invalid but rejected the argument that either the
 federal or the state constitution required districts of equal population, determining that
 "the convenience of the people in the particular circumstances of a county may re-
 quire-and constitutionally justify-a rational variance from equality in population." Id at
 428. The Texas Supreme Court required that districting be based on the "number of quali-
 fied voters, land areas, geography, miles of county roads and taxable values." Id.
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 The first argument was premised on the traditional view, ar-
 ticulated in Hunter v City of Pittsburgh,"' that localities are juridi-
 cally mere administrative arms of the state, not autonomous gov-
 ernments. The Supreme Court had reaffirmed just this point in
 Reynolds v Sims,20 explaining that although representation in Con-
 gress could be based on states,21 state legislative districts must be
 based primarily on population and not on the representation of lo-
 cal governments. As Reynolds noted, citing Hunter, states are
 "separate and distinct governmental entities which have delegated
 some, but not all, of their formerly held powers to the single na-
 tional government," but "[p]olitical subdivisions of
 States-counties, cities, or whatever . . . have been traditionally
 regarded as subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by
 the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental func-
 tions."22 As "the fountainhead of representative government in this
 country,"23 state legislatures must be subject to the equal popula-
 tion principle, but local governments might not be so constrained
 since they exist to carry out the state's governmental functions.
 The Hunter view of local government as a creature of the state
 suggests that a state ought to be able to design local governments
 along the lines it deems appropriate to effectuate its purposes. Av-
 ery, however, rejected this line of argument. Although the Consti-
 tution does not require the states to have local governments, to
 make them locally elective or locally accountable, or to grant them
 lawmaking autonomy, the Supreme Court found that the states, in
 fact, "characteristically provide for representative govern-
 ment-for decisionmaking at the local level by representatives
 19 207 US 161 (1907).
 20 377 US 533, 575 (1964).
 21 Each state regardless of population is represented by two Senators. Each state re-
 gardless of population is guaranteed one seat in the House of Representatives. The guaran-
 tee of one seat per state means that House district populations will differ somewhat from
 state to state. The one person/one vote principle has been interpreted to require strict intra-
 state equality of district population, not strict interstate district equality.
 22 377 US at 574-75. This discussion of the nature of local governments arose in the
 context of the Court's rejection of the so-called "federal analogy" as a defense for malappor-
 tioned state legislatures. Proponents of the federal analogy argued that when states utilize
 the county as a unit of representation in the legislature-designing state senates on a one
 county/one vote rule and state lower houses with a minimum of one representative per
 county and the remaining seats distributed among counties according to population-they
 are simply following the model set forth in the federal Constitution for the structure of
 Congress. See id at 571-72. In dismissing the federal analogy, the Court sharply contrasted
 the "sovereign" aspect of the states with the distinctly subordinate status of local govern-
 ments. Id at 574-75.
 23 Id at 564.
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 elected by the people."24 In practice, local governments "univer-
 sally" exist, enjoy considerable "policy and decisionmaking" auton-
 omy, and operate as representative institutions.26 States that pro-
 vide for elective local governments must abide by the
 constitutional rules for representative democracies. Thus, the
 equal population principle applies at the local level.26
 The second argument grew out of an earlier hint by the Su-
 preme Court that one person/one vote might be limited to "legisla-
 tive" bodies and thus might not apply to "administrative" enti-
 ties.27 The Texas Supreme Court had determined that the county
 commissioners court was essentially an administrative agency, not
 a local version of the state legislature. According to the Texas
 court, "I[t]he primary function of the commissioners court is the
 administration of the business affairs of the county. Its legislative
 functions are negligible and county government is not otherwise
 comparable to the legislature of a state."28
 The commissioners court blended administrative and legisla-
 tive powers. It lacked general lawmaking authority, but it was re-
 sponsible for equalizing tax assessments and setting the tax rate
 pursuant to a state formula, conducting elections, letting contracts,
 issuing bonds, adopting a county budget, and administering
 peacekeeping, public welfare services, roads, and bridges.29 Many
 other local governments do not abide by the tripartite separation
 of powers characteristic of the federal and state governments. Lo-
 cal government is marked by a profusion of boards, commissions,
 and authorities that combine legislative and executive authority
 24 Avery, 390 US at 481.
 26 Id.
 26 Id. The Court also dismissed the argument that local majorities are adequately pro-
 tected by their ability to seek state legislative restructuring of local governments to prevent
 malapportionment. One argument for judicial enforcement of the one person/one vote prin-
 ciple at the federal or state level is the need for some constitutional rule that prevents a
 current legislative majority from manipulating the electoral rules to entrench itself. The
 malapportionment of a local governing body is subject to correction by the state. Indeed, in
 the aftermath of Reynolds v Sims, the residents of the urban portion of Midland County, or
 of other rural-dominated malapportioned counties, could have sought redress from a state
 legislature comporting with the principles of equally populated districts and majority rule.
 In finding that one person/one vote is a constitutional prerequisite for democratic local gov-
 ernments, the Court determined that a properly apportioned state legislature could not au-
 thorize a malapportioned local body. Id at 481 n 6.
 27 Sailors, 387 US at 108, 110 (referring to the "nonlegislative character" and "adminis-
 trative functions" of a county board of education).
 28 Avery, 406 SW2d at 426 (citation omitted).
 29 Avery, 390 US at 483.
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 over various governmental functions.30 In some areas there might
 be no one local body with broad enough authority to be deemed
 the local equivalent of the state legislature.
 Avery rejected the effort to confine the one person/one vote
 principle to legislative bodies. Instead, the Court catalogued the
 commissioners court's powers, found it had authority "to make a
 large number of decisions having a broad range of impacts,"3' and,
 therefore, held that it must comply with the "one ground rule for
 the development of arrangements of local government"-one per-
 son/one vote.32
 The third argument contended that a county government, un-
 like a state legislature, could be structured to favor a particular
 constituency because that constituency has a particular stake in
 the county government's operation. Texas, like most other states,
 is entirely subdivided into counties. In a sense, counties appear to
 be in the same relation to the state as states are to the nation. But,
 whereas only one state government has jurisdiction in any given
 state, there was another general-purpose local government in Mid-
 land County-the City of Midland. City dwellers in Midland
 County received most of their services from, and engaged in collec-
 tive local decisionmaking through, their own city government. The
 commissioners court, although possessing legal jurisdiction over
 both city and noncity areas of the county, was in practice the local
 government for the rural areas.33 According to the Texas Supreme
 Court, the functions that fell within the commissioners court's lim-
 ited jurisdiction-"roads, bridges, taxable values of large land ar-
 eas-disproportionately concern[ed] the rural areas."34 If represen-
 tation in the commissioners court were based solely on population,
 "[t]he voice of the rural areas [would] be lost for all practical pur-
 30 As the Supreme Court noted, local governments "cannot easily be classified in the
 neat categories favored by civics texts." Id at 482.
 31 Id at 483.
 32 Id at 485.
 3 Avery, 406 SW2d at 428. As the Texas Supreme Court had determined,
 "[t]heoretically, the commissioners court is the governing body of the county . . . . But
 developments during the years have greatly narrowed the functions of the commissioners
 court and limited its major responsibilities to the nonurban areas of the county."
 34 Id. The county government did wield considerable power over city residents, but
 most of those powers were in the hands of officials who were elected on a countywide basis,
 with city dwellers enjoying their proportionate share in the county electorate. These officials
 included the assessor and collector of taxes, the county attorney, the sheriff, the treasurer,
 the county clerk, and the county surveyor. Avery, 390 US at 505 (Fortas dissenting). Ac-
 cording to the Texas Supreme Court, "the various officials elected by all the voters of the
 county have spheres that are delegated to them by law and within which the commissioners
 court may not interfere or usurp." Avery, 406 SW2d at 428.
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 poses."31 Thus, the Texas court concluded that some districting
 bias in favor of rural residents was appropriate to assure rural resi-
 dents effective representation in their own local government.
 The United States Supreme Court, however, focused on the
 commissioners court's potential to affect all county residents. The
 commissioners court may have attended only to its rural constitu-
 ents, but it possessed authority to make "a substantial number of
 decisions that affect all citizens," including city residents.36 The
 Court reversed the Texas Supreme Court's reasoning, seeing in the
 commissioners court's concentration on rural matters not a justifi-
 cation for continued rural domination but the baleful consequences
 of past malapportionments that gave rural residents the upper
 hand in deliberations.37 The Midland County situation may have
 too closely resembled the rural domination of state legislatures,
 which Reynolds had so recently and controversially invalidated, to
 have been sustained, even though the presence of another local
 government that provided city residents with their own general
 purpose government could have provided the basis for a different
 decision.
 The Court left open the possibility that in another setting dif-
 ferences in governmental impact might justify departures from
 equal population representation. For "a special-purpose unit of
 government assigned the performance of functions affecting defina-
 ble groups of constituents more than other constituents," those
 more affected by the government's decision might be given a
 greater electoral voice than those less affected.38 But, emphasizing
 the broad formal powers of the commissioners court over city resi-
 dents, the Court found that all citizens of the county, including the
 city dwellers, were affected by the county unit's powers.39
 B. Applying Avery to Special Purpose Elections and Special Pur-
 pose Districts
 After Avery, a central theme would be the tension between
 state efforts to design local governments serving particular local
 constituencies (and arranging systems of local voting and represen-
 tation accordingly), and the claims by other local residents that
 they are sufficiently affected by a local unit's action that they too
 35 Id.
 3" Avery, 390 US at 484.
 37 Id.
 38 Id at 483-84.
 38 Id at 484.
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 ought to be enfranchised or equally represented. How the Court
 assessed the extent of the impact of a particular locality's action,
 and the nature of the burden of proof it placed upon the state,
 would be pivotal in determining whether the state could design lo-
 cal elections or governments accountable to particular
 constituencies.
 Cipriano v City of Houma40 and City of Phoenix v Kolodziej-
 ski4l considered state laws that limited the vote in municipal bond
 issue elections to taxpayers-the vestige of a long history of prop-
 erty-based voting in municipal elections. This tradition reflects
 both the role of property owners as providers of the principal
 source of local government revenue and the function of municipal
 governments of providing services to property.42
 Cipriano involved Louisiana laws that allowed only property
 taxpayers to vote in elections called to approve the issuance of rev-
 enue bonds by a municipal utility. The Louisiana rule effectively
 excluded about sixty percent of the city's registered voters from
 the bond issue election.43 No federal constitutional provision re-
 quires popular approval of the decision to incur debt, and the bond
 issue vote was merely a "limited purpose election" rather than an
 election to the city's governing body. Nevertheless, the Court de-
 termined that because the right to vote had been granted to some
 and not to others, strict scrutiny applied and the restriction could
 be sustained only if necessary to promote a compelling state
 interest.44
 The Court rejected the city's contention that property owners
 had a "special pecuniary interest" in the efficient operation of the
 utility system and, thus, a special stake in the outcome of the bond
 election.46 The revenue bond would be financed by charges im-
 posed on utility users, and both property owners and non-property
 owners used the utility system and paid utility bills. Although the
 profits from the utility system's operations were paid into the gen-
 eral fund of the city and so could be used to reduce the burden on
 property owners who paid the taxes that financed city services,
 that did not create a sufficiently great distinction between the in-
 terests of property owners and the rest of the community.
 40 395 US 701 (1969).
 41 399 US 204 (1970).
 43 See also Hill, 421 US 289 (invalidating Texas requirement of concurrent majorities of
 all voters and of taxpayers to approve bond issue).
 C3 Cipriano, 395 US at 705.
 44 Id at 704.
 45 Id.
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 City of Phoenix was harder than Cipriano"' because the case
 concerned an election called to authorize the issuance of general
 obligation bonds. Arizona, along with thirteen other states,47 lim-
 ited the franchise in some or all general obligation bond issue elec-
 tions to qualified voters who also paid real property taxes to the
 municipality. Under Arizona law, property taxes were to be levied
 to service this indebtedness.48 Property taxpayers, thus, would be
 directly burdened by the bond issue. Moreover, the general obliga-
 tion bonds were secured by the general taxing power of the munici-
 pality. The bonds were "in effect a lien on the real property sub-
 ject to taxation by the issuing municipality,"49 so that the property
 taxpayers were ultimately at risk for repayment of the debt.
 Although the Court recognized that "owners of real property
 have interests somewhat different from the interests of non-prop-
 erty owners,"60 City of Phoenix followed Avery in assuming that
 the community-wide consequences of the local vote outweighed
 any differences in impact the bond and taxes might have for prop-
 erty owners. The Court looked first to the municipal improvements
 that would be financed by the bond issue and found that the bene-
 fits would accrue to property owners and nonowners alike. Because
 all residents would be "substantially affected" by the outcome of
 the election, "presumptively" the Constitution would not permit
 the exclusion of qualified electors from the franchise.-'
 Turning to the financial burden the bonds would impose, the
 Court noted that although the nominal source of revenue for debt
 service was the property tax, in practice Phoenix had been collect-
 ing about half the revenues it needed to repay its debts from other
 local taxes, which were paid by nonowners as well as owners of real
 property. More importantly, the Court determined that even if all
 the revenues to service the debt were to come from the property
 tax, that still would not justify the discrimination in the municipal
 46 Cipriano was the only one of the six local government one person/one vote decisions
 in the period from 1968 through 1971 in which there was no dissent. Justices Harlan, Stew-
 art, and Fortas dissented in Avery. 390 US at 486, 495, 509 (respectively). Justices Harlan
 and Stewart and Chief Justice Burger dissented in City of Phoenix, 399 US at 215. Justices
 Black, Harlan, and Stewart dissented in Kramer, 395 US at 634. Justices Harlan and Stew-
 art and Chief Justice Burger dissented in Hadley v Junior College District, 397 US 50, 59
 (1970). Justices Brennan and Douglas dissented in Abate v Mundt, 403 US 182, 187 (1971).
 47 Id at 213 n 11.
 48 City of Phoenix, 399 US at 205. The city was legally privileged to use other revenues
 for this purpose. Id.
 49 Id at 208.
 50 Id at 212.
 "I Id at 209.
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 franchise because "a significant part of the ultimate burden"
 would be passed along by residential property owners to their te-
 nants and by commercial property owners to the Phoenix residents
 who consumed the goods and services they produced.62 The Court
 made little effort to substantiate its postulate that the incidence of
 the property tax was borne by the community as a whole rather
 than just the taxpayers, but it noted that the parties had stipu-
 lated that real property taxes were a cost of doing business for
 landlords "and as such ha[ve] a material bearing" on rents.53 The
 Court did not discuss competition in the Phoenix rental market or
 the extent to which goods and services produced by Phoenix com-
 mercial property owners were consumed within the city rather
 than exported. Instead, the Court appeared simply to assume as a
 matter of moderately sophisticated common sense that the debt
 service burden, like the benefits from new facilities, would be
 widely diffused throughout the entire community.
 Nor was the Court persuaded by the argument that the gen-
 eral obligation bond was a "lien" on property within the city "in
 the sense that the issuer undertakes to levy sufficient taxes to ser-
 vice the bond."54 The lien theory was predicated on "the risk of
 future economic collapse that might result in bond obligations be-
 coming an unshiftable, unsharable burden on property owners.",,
 The Court was unwilling to base a limitation on the municipal
 franchise on such apocalyptic reasoning. As in Avery, the Court
 would not tolerate the continuation of a longstanding structural
 preference for one group within the community-even a group that
 might be more interested in or at risk from government action-in
 the local electoral process.
 In Kramer v Union Free School District No. 15,66 the Su-
 preme Court again presumed that a local government's action has
 a community-wide impact. Kramer involved a New York law that
 limited the right to vote in school board elections to the owners or
 renters of taxable property in the school district and to the parents
 of children enrolled in the district's schools. The plaintiff was an
 otherwise eligible voter who had no children, lived with his par-
 ents, and neither owned nor leased taxable property.
 b2 Id at 210-11.
 bS Id at 210 n 6.
 " Id at 212.
 bb Id.
 Il 395 US 621 (1969).
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 The Court could have treated the school district as a Hunter-
 style state instrumentality rather than as a local organ. In New
 York and most other states, education is a subject of plenary state
 power. Avery had cited the state practice of according localities
 home rule to justify the one person/one vote requirement,67 but
 state control of education is typically unconstrained by any state
 constitutional protection of local autonomy. School boards have
 limited authority, do not enjoy home rule status, and are generally
 subject to considerable oversight by the state.68
 Kramer, however, dismissed the relevance of the differences
 between a school board and a city or county government. Strict
 judicial scrutiny of the limitation on the franchise was required,
 not because of "the subject" of the election, but because of the fact
 of an election.69 The use of a local election to fill the seats on the
 school board made the school board a locally representative body.
 The state was not required to provide for an elective school
 board,60 but having chosen to make the school board democrati-
 cally accountable to a local electorate; the state's definition of the
 electorate was subject to federal constitutional standards. The dis-
 enfranchisement of some adult resident members of the commu-
 nity would trigger close judicial examination.
 The state defended its franchise requirement by arguing that
 the resulting school district electorate was the portion of the com-
 munity "primarily interested in" and "primarily affected" by
 school board elections-parents and the direct and indirect payers
 of the property tax.61 In general, those who use or pay for, even
 indirectly, the district's single service, would have a significantly
 greater stake in the operation of the local school system than other
 members of the community. Moreover, because of their enhanced
 interest, these groups ought to be willing to put in more time and
 effort to study school issues, deliberate, and pursue efficient and
 effective school policies. Indeed, the parents and payors arguably
 had an interest in not having their voice in school affairs diluted
 by those lacking a comparably strong connection to the schools.
 The Court declined to decide whether a state has a compelling
 interest in limiting the local franchise to a "primarily interested"
 " 390 US at 481.
 " Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School Finance Reform, 24 Conn L
 Rev 773, 780 (1992).
 "I Kramer, 395 US at 629.
 60 Id at 628-29. See also Cipriano, 395 US at 704.
 61 Kramer, 395 US at 630-32.
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 constituency. Instead, the Court found that the state had failed to
 align the franchise precisely with the group primarily interested;
 that is, the state had not enfranchised all those, and just those,
 "primarily interested" in school board elections. The state in-
 cluded those with "a remote and indirect interest in school affairs
 and, on the other hand, exclude[d] others who have a distinct and
 direct interest in the school meeting decisions.""2
 The Court, however, never defined what constitutes an "inter-
 est" sufficient to justify a claim to the franchise in a special district
 election. Who had been enfranchised despite "a remote and indi-
 rect interest in school affairs?" In a footnote, the Court noted that
 "an uninterested unemployed young man who pays no state or fed-
 eral taxes, but who rents an apartment in the district, can partici-
 pate in the election."63 Of course, in City of Phoenix the Court
 assumed that property taxes were passed along to just such rent-
 ers; moreover, the plaintiff in Kramer had argued that he, too, was
 affected by the property tax, even though he neither paid it nor
 rented taxable property, because property tax levels affect the
 price of goods and services in the community."4 In what way, then,
 was the "uninterested unemployed young man" actually uninter-
 ested if his rent was affected by school district tax levels? Simi-
 larly, in the same footnote the Court described the plaintiff as "in-
 terested in and affected by school board decisions,"85 without ever
 indicating how the plaintiff was affected or what his interest was if
 he neither used the school district's services nor paid for them. Al-
 though it may be argued that all area residents are intrinsically
 affected by the quality of the local elementary and secondary
 school system, the Court did not justify its decision in these
 terms.66 Instead, the Court's use of the term "interest," and its
 contrast between Kramer and his fictional unemployed counter-
 part, suggests that the relevant interests were subjective states of
 mind, rather than objective ties to school board operations.
 Kramer was attentive to and concerned about local school affairs.
 He was, therefore, "interested." His fictional unemployed counter-
 part was indifferent when the subject of education came up and
 therefore, not "interested." Thus, the state statute had failed to
 es Id at 632.
 63 Id at 632 n 15.
 " Id at 630.
 00 Id.
 00 The Court noted that Kramer had framed his claim to an interest in school board
 operations in these terms. Id at 630. But the Court simply stated Kramer's contention of
 interest without commenting on it.
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 discriminate with sufficient precision when it sought to vest the
 school board franchise only in those "interested." Kramer's subjec-
 tive approach to "interest" would make it impossible to so limit
 the franchise if any resident of the community, who is otherwise
 eligible to vote, can claim to be "interested" in the subject of the
 election.
 Unlike the disenfranchisements or dilutions in other cases,
 there was nothing especially troubling about the franchise restric-
 tion in Kramer. The state had not excluded any traditionally vic-
 timized groups, such as women or racial minorities. There was no
 entrenchment of a territorial minority whose interests were argua-
 bly adverse to the demographic majority, as in the rural-dominated
 malapportioned bodies at issue in Reynolds and Avery. There was
 no class discrimination, as in the exclusion of nonowners of prop-
 erty or nonpayers of local taxes; the state permitted renters and
 propertyless parents to vote in school board elections. By applying
 "exacting" review to the franchise limitation in this context,
 Kramer underscored the significance of the Court's presumption
 that all adult residents of a local jurisdiction are comparably af-
 fected by and interested in that jurisdiction's governance.
 Arguably, the public school district is a special case. Public
 elementary and secondary education is probably the most impor-
 tant locally provided service. Despite formal state control, the
 states have generally chosen to entrust substantial administrative
 and fiscal responsibilities to local school districts. Local control has
 been a highly prized value in elementary and secondary education
 and, although local control is often associated with parental con-
 trol, it has been asserted that a public school system "has a more
 pervasive influence in the community than do most other" special
 districts.67 But in Hadley v Junior College District of Metropoli-
 tan Kansas City,68 the Court extended one person/one vote to a
 district with far less impact on most local residents and further
 removed from the traditional core functions of local govern-
 ment-a junior college district.
 Hadley concerned the apportionment of the six-member board
 of trustees of the Metropolitan Kansas City Junior College Dis-
 trict. The junior college district was composed of eight local school
 districts. The largest component school district received three of
 the seats, even though it had sixty percent of the population base.
 17 395 US at 640 n 9 (Stewart dissenting).
 68 397 US 50 (1970).
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 18:56:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 19931 One Person/One Vote 357
 The other seven districts shared the remaining three seats, al-
 though they had only forty percent of the population base.69
 Following Kramer, the Court treated the fact that the junior
 college trustees were elected as dispositive. "[A]s a general rule,
 whenever a state or local government decides to select persons by
 popular election to perform governmental functions," each quali-
 fied voter must be entitled to cast an equally weighted vote.70 The
 Court left open the possibility "that there might be some case in
 which a State elects certain functionaries whose duties are so far
 removed from normal governmental activities and so dispropor-
 tionately affect different groups that a popular election in compli-
 ance with Reynolds [] might not be required."'71 But junior college
 trustees were governmental officials "in every relevant sense of
 that term."72
 The Metropolitan Kansas City Junior College District was the
 first local government the Court examined in a one person/one
 vote case that had been created as an aggregation of other, smaller
 constituent local units. The Court did not see in the federative na-
 ture of the junior college district any justification for a departure
 from one person/one vote. The junior college district had resulted
 from a local referendum involving the component smaller school
 districts, and the trustee board structure was a compromise be-
 tween the interests of large school districts and smaller ones. More
 populous districts were assured their own distinct seats on the
 board, whereas the smaller school districts were aggregated into
 one election district. But the larger districts received less than
 Missouri law provided for the allocation of seats on the board of trustees based on
 "school enumeration," that is, the number of persons between the ages of six and twenty. If
 no one of the component school districts had one-third of the total school enumeration of
 the junior college district then all six seats would be filled at large. If, however, a district
 had at least one-third but less than one-half of the total enumeration, it was entitled to two
 seats, with the others filled at large from the other districts. If a district had at least one-
 half but less than two-thirds of the enumeration, it received three seats. If a district had
 more than two-thirds of the enumeration, it received four seats. For each apportionment,
 then, the number of seats allocated to a populous district was at the bottom end of its range.
 397 US at 56-57. The Kansas City school district contained approximately 60% of the
 school enumeration, so voters in that district could elect three of the six junior college trust-
 ees. The remaining seven districts, with 40% of the enumeration, received the other three
 seats. Id at 56-57.
 The Court questioned but did not decide whether school enumeration figures and not
 population could be used as a basis for apportionment. Id at 57-58 n 9.
 70 Id at 56. The Court held there were no "judicially manageable standards" to deter-
 mine the importance of an office or to distinguish for apportionment purposes between "leg-
 islative" and "administrative" officials. Id at 55.
 71 Id.
 72 Id at 56.
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 their population share and the smaller districts correspondingly
 more, although the extent of deviation was controlled so that
 larger districts would never be underrepresented by more than 16
 2/3 percent, and the smaller districts would never be over-
 represented by more than 16 2/3 percent more 7-a far cry from the
 malapportionment in Avery where five percent of the population
 received seventy-five percent of the seats on the commissioners
 court. Some deviation from equal population representation was
 inevitable so long as the junior college board was composed of con-
 stituent school districts of substantially differing populations and
 the constituent school districts were units of election for some
 board seats. As Justice Harlan pointed out in dissent, had the state
 corrected the underrepresentation of the largest district while still
 using school districts as election units and not changing the
 board's size, then the largest district would have been
 overrepresented.74
 Perhaps the Court was suspicious of a "built-in bias in favor of
 small districts,"75 which may have conjured up the pro-rural pref-
 erence of the apportionment schemes invalidated in Reynolds and
 Avery. In any event, the deviation from equality was deemed too
 substantial for the general principle of equally weighted votes. The
 federative structure of the board and the possibility that the ap-
 portionment scheme might have been a necessary inducement to
 some of the component districts to join the regional entity were
 treated as irrelevant to the constitutional question. In declining to
 liberalize the standard of review for federative governments, Had-
 ley limited the options for the representation of constituent units
 in regional entities.76
 73 Id at 56-57.
 74 Id at 68.
 76 Id at 58.
 76 A year after Hadley the Supreme Court slightly liberalized its approach to the repre-
 sentation of subunits in larger local governments. Abate v Mundt, 403 US 182 (1971), in-
 volved the Board of Supervisors of Rockland County, New York. The Board had tradition-
 ally consisted of the supervisors of each of the county's five constituent towns. "The result
 [had] been a local structure in which overlapping public services are provided by the towns
 and their county working in close cooperation." Id at 183. The five towns, however, were
 significantly unequal in population. Rockland sought to comply with Avery while continuing
 to use the towns as units of election to the Board. The smallest town elected one supervisor
 and the other towns became multimember districts. Nevertheless, adherence to town lines
 resulted in some deviation from mathematical equality and, thus, overrepresentation rela-
 tive to population for some towns and underrepresentation for others. The total deviation
 from population equality, 11.9%, was greater than any the Supreme Court had upheld since
 it had articulated the one person/one vote rule. The Court, however, sustained the plan,
 finding that the benefits of respecting town lines, the "long tradition of overlapping func-
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 Kramer's and Hadley's stress on the fact of election, rather
 than the subject of the election, as the trigger for strict judicial
 review; Hadley's view that a junior college district performs gov-
 ernmental functions that require its representation structure to
 conform to one person/one vote; and Kramer's expansive definition
 of the sort of interest that would give an otherwise qualified local
 resident a claim to an equally weighted vote cast considerable
 doubt over the validity of restrictions in thousands of other special
 district elections. The dissenters in Kramer and Hadley expressed
 the fear that the decisions would bar states from limiting special
 district electorates to those who receive a district's services or pay
 for its operations.77 The federal norm of full enfranchisement of
 the adult residents of the jurisdiction and equally weighted voting
 would appear to be applicable to virtually all local governments.
 Kramer and Hadley, however, proved to be the high-water mark in
 the Supreme Court's treatment of local governments as local de-
 mocracies. The Court subsequently developed a new model of local
 government not subject to these norms, thus permitting the crea-
 tion and survival of large numbers of local governments with spe-
 cialized constituencies.
 II. SPECIAL DISTRICTS AND THE MODEL OF PROPRIETARY
 GOVERNMENT
 There are nearly 30,000 special districts in the United States,
 and the special district is our most rapidly growing form of local
 government.78 For voting rights and representation purposes, the
 Supreme Court has conceived of some special districts as more like
 tions" in Rockland County, and the lack of built-in favoritism for any particular towns justi-
 fied the population deviation. Id at 187.
 The value of Abate as the basis for a model of local federative or regional government,
 however, is uncertain. The Court noted that "because [ ] all governmental entities are inter-
 related in numerous ways," it would be hesitant to accept the argument that intergovern-
 mental coordination is a sufficient basis for greater use of small unit representation in larger
 local governments. Id at 186. Rockland County's "long tradition" was a crucial fact support-
 ing the outcome in Abate. Subsequently, the Court held that a state's interest in respecting
 political subdivisions may justify some modest departure from population equality in a state
 or local legislative body. But population equality remains the dominant criterion in legisla-
 tive apportionment and the representation of political subdivisions is quite limited. See Ma-
 han v Howell, 410 US 315, 329 (1973) (16.4% deviation from equality in apportionment
 approaches, but does not exceed tolerable constitutional limit).
 11 Kramer, 395 US at 640 n 9 (Stewart dissenting); Hadley, 397 US at 61 (Harlan
 dissenting).
 78 See, for example, David L. Chicoine and Norman Walzer, Governmental Structure
 and Local Public Finance 8-16 (Oelgeschlager, Gunn, and Hain, 1985); William G. Colman,
 State and Local Government and Public-Private Partnerships 22 (Greenwood, 1989).
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 private enterprises than governments. The Court initially em-
 ployed this model to exempt from the rigors of strict judicial scru-
 tiny special districts created to aid agricultural development in
 sparsely populated areas. These districts gave landowners control
 over governmental subunits with authority limited to the storage,
 reclamation, and provision of water for farming. The Court, how-
 ever, subsequently extended the proprietary model to a district
 that provides nonagricultural services, operates in an urban set-
 ting, and overlaps general purpose governments.
 Although not all special districts have been treated as proprie-
 tary governments and many do not utilize landowner voting, the
 proprietary cases influence contemporary understandings of local
 government. The proprietary model underscores the continuing
 power of the idea, undercut in Kramer and the municipal bond
 cases, that those who have the primary financial stake in local op-
 erations ought to have a controlling voice in governance decisions.
 Given the power of the states to generate special districts and to
 place government functions in proprietary special districts that
 overlap or are coterminous with general purpose governments sub-
 ject to the rules of democratic representation, it will sometimes be
 difficult to determine whether a particular local election will be
 subject to proprietary or democratic rules. With the increased reli-
 ance on special districts to fund public infrastructure,79 there may
 be a conflict between the imperatives of financing public services
 and improvements and the normative commitment to participation
 by the community as a whole in decisions concerning the scope and
 financing of public facilities.
 A. The Emergence of the Proprietary Model
 In the Western states there are more than 700 specialized local
 governments created to manage that arid region's scarce water re-
 sources.80 These governments plan and undertake projects for the
 acquisition, appropriation, diversion, storage, reclamation, conser-
 vation, and distribution of water and for irrigation. Typically,
 these districts may condemn land, issue debt, and impose assess-
 79 See, for example, Virginia Marion Perrenod, Special Districts, Special Purposes:
 Fringe Governments and Urban Problems in the Houston Area chs 1, 2, 5 (Texas A&M,
 1984); John J. Harrigan, Political Change in the Metropolis 263-65 (Little, Brown, 4th ed
 1989).
 80 See Tim De Young, Governing Special Districts: The Conflict Between Voting
 Rights and Property Privileges, 1982 Ariz St L J 419, 428 table 3 (tabulating irrigation and
 water conservation districts in eleven Western states).
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 ments on land in the district. The interest on water district debt,
 like other municipal bond interest, is exempt from federal income
 taxation.8' Most special purpose water districts are governed by lo-
 cally elected boards of directors, with the franchise granted to the
 owners of land in the district and the votes allotted according to
 assessed valuation or acreage.82
 In Salyer Land Co. v Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dis-
 trict,83 decided three years after Hadley, the Supreme Court up-
 held a California law providing that only landowners could partici-
 pate in elections for the governing board of the Tulare Lake Basin
 Water Storage District and that landowner votes would be allotted
 according to the assessed valuation of their lands in the jurisdic-
 tion. The Court determined that the water storage district, "by
 reason of its special limited purpose and of the disproportionate
 effect of its activities on landowners as a group,"84 fell within Had-
 ley's provision of an exemption from Reynolds for the election of
 "certain functionaries whose duties are so far removed from nor-
 mal governmental activities and so disproportionately affect differ-
 ent groups,"8" that a popular election might not be required. As a
 result, the district's voting arrangements were not subject to strict
 judicial scrutiny.
 The Court in Salyer was markedly more deferential to state
 determinations concerning local arrangements and much less pro-
 tective of the interest of local residents in voting in local elections
 than it had been previously. The Court predicated the exception
 from the model of local democratic government on the "special
 limited purpose" of the water storage district and the "dispropor-
 tionate effect of its activities on landowners." But neither "special
 limited purpose," nor "disproportionate effect" was adequately
 defined.
 From the perspective of residents dependent on the district's
 water, it is not obvious that water storage is a more limited func-
 tion than a junior college. Indeed, comparing governmental func-
 tions is just the sort of standardless exercise that Hadley had
 warned against in refusing to hinge the standard of review on the
 81 Id at 425.
 82 Id at 424 table 1. See also David L. Martin, One Person, One Vote and California's
 Water Districts, 8 Natural Resources Lawyer 9 n 2 (1973) (tracing history and case law of
 California water districts and weighing the needs of private utilities against the interests of
 the public).
 83 410 US 719 (1973).
 84 Id at 728.
 88 Id at 727-28, quoting Hadley, 397 US at 56.
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 "importance" of an office.86 Furthermore, although the California
 water storage district legislation established a fairly tight nexus
 linking receipt of water, assessment for water project costs, and the
 local vote,87 the Court did not explain how the water district ar-
 rangement differed from the service-payment-franchise relation-
 ship in Kramer. Much as nonparents and nontaxpayers may be af-
 fected by the operations of a local school board, water storage
 district residents as well as landowners may be affected by district
 actions. Indeed, the Salyer litigation was apparently triggered by a
 decision of the district's board that resulted in the flooding of
 lands where nonowner residents lived.88
 Salyer broke from Kramer and the municipal bond cases in
 assuming that the "economic burdens of district operations" were
 the sole interest that would support a claim to the franchise.89
 Moreover, even within the sphere of economic burdens Salyer de-
 parted from City of Phoenix in focusing only on those who paid
 district charges and assessments. The Court did not consider
 whether those costs might have been passed on to district residents
 who were the lessees of the district's landowners.90
 In Kramer the Court had subjected the statutory linkage of
 service usage, payment, and function to strict scrutiny and as-
 sumed that district actions had sufficient impact on residents, in
 addition to users and payors of a district's service, that their exclu-
 sion from the franchise could not survive exacting review. In con-
 trast, the Court in Salyer took a comparable linkage of usage, pay-
 ment, and function, and, without considering whether district
 actions might have broader impacts on district residents, pro-
 ceeded to exempt the franchise restriction from strict scrutiny. It
 sufficed that the state had rationally concluded that the landown-
 ers who bear the burden of district costs should be given control
 over district governance.91
 *6 397 US at 55.
 87 The district's revenues came only from landowners, either in assessments against
 land or in water charges. A delinquency in payment of an assessment became a lien on the
 land, and "residents qua residents" bore none of the district's economic burdens. Salyer,
 410 US at 729.
 " Id at 737-38 (Douglas dissenting).
 89 Id at 729.
 90 See Salyer Land Co. v Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 342 F Supp 144,
 150 (E D Cal 1972) (three-judge court) (Browning concurring in part and dissenting in part)
 (lessees are "equally interested in the cost of the district's projects, for this expense will be
 passed on to them by express agreement or in the form of increased rentals").
 "' Salyer, 410 US at 731.
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 Salyer's more liberal standard of review of the restricted local
 franchise suggests a different model of local government than the
 one seen in the cases in the line from Avery through Hadley.Y2
 This is apparent in three ways. First, the notion of a local govern-
 ment as a small polity, with local political institutions representa-
 tive of the local citizenry and providing an opportunity to voice
 concerns, protect interests, and participate in the determination of
 political issues that affect the community, was utterly absent from
 Salyer. That may have been because there was no community to
 speak of in the Tulare Lake Basin district. Local government as
 self-government by local residents is generally associated with
 urbanness and the greater degree of shared interests or common
 needs for public services or regulatory authority that stem from
 concentration of population. But only fifty-nine adults lived on the
 district's 193,000 acres, and they were primarily employees of the
 four agribusinesses that owned most of the district's land.,3 The
 district was a rural area whose population was far below the mini-
 mum necessary to incorporate a municipality.94 As the Supreme
 Court emphasized, "[t]here are no towns, shops, hospitals, or other
 facilities designed to improve the quality of life within the district
 boundaries, and it does not have a fire department, police, buses,
 or trains."95 Although the Court used this description of a sparsely
 populated agricultural area to suggest that the district lacked "nor-
 mal governmental" authority, the paucity of "towns, shops, hospi-
 tals, or other facilities" indicates not an absence of governmental
 92 In Associated Enterprises v Toltec Watershed Improvement District, 410 US 743
 (1973), a companion case decided the same day as Salyer, the Supreme Court sustained a
 Wyoming law that limited the franchise in the referendum for the creation of a watershed
 improvement district to landowners and provided that votes representing a majority of the
 acreage affected were necessary to approve a district. Like California water storage districts,
 Wyoming watershed districts are financed by assessments against the benefitted lands. The
 Court found that the district was "a governmental unit of special or limited purpose whose
 activities have a disproportionate effect on landowners within the district." Id at 744. The
 Court noted that the statute authorizing the establishment of watershed districts, with the
 restriction on the referendum electorate, "was enacted by a legislature in which all of the
 State's electors have the unquestioned right to be fairly represented." Id. In Avery and
 Kramer the Court had sharply dismissed the relevance of a state legislature elected on the
 basis of universal adult suffrage and equal population representation in determining the
 constitutionality of local government representation or suffrage provisions. Avery, 390 US at
 481; Kramer, 395 US at 628.
 9S Salyer, 410 US at 723.
 4 California requires a population of 500 registered voters as a precondition for a mu-
 nicipal incorporation. Cal Govt Code ? 56043 (West 1983 & Supp 1993).
 9b Salyer, 410 US at 729.
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 power for the district's governing board but the lack of a commu-
 nity within the district appropriate for self-government.
 Second, the absence of a local political community may have
 made it easier to see the water storage district as a creation of the
 state intended to address the problem of water management in the
 Tulare Lake Basin. The three-judge court that initially heard
 Salyer had applied strict scrutiny and found that the state had a
 compelling interest-"the development of its water resources."
 The court found that limiting the vote to landowners was neces-
 sary to further this interest because under state law district opera-
 tions were financed by assessments against land, and it was
 "doubtful if the District would have been formed unless the per-
 sons paying the expenses could control them."96 The state, how-
 ever, could have imposed the water storage districts without local
 consent as long as the assessed landowners benefitted from district
 operations and were given a fair opportunity to challenge their
 particular assessments.97 The state also could have addressed the
 water storage problem directly through a state agency financed by
 state revenues and operated by state officials, thus obviating the
 need for any local consent or any local participation in district
 management.
 To survive strict scrutiny, a local landowner-financed and local
 landowner-controlled district created with the consent of local
 landowners must be necessary to address the agricultural water
 management problem. Placing control directly in the hands of
 those most directly affected by the district's operations may in-
 crease the likelihood that the district will operate effectively and
 efficiently to secure the interests of local landowners. But given the
 inherent incommensurability of voting rights and water manage-
 ment performance, there is no obvious calculus, under strict scru-
 tiny, for determining whether the enhancement of district per-
 " Salyer, 342 F Supp at 146. See also Schindler v Palo Verde Irrigation District, 1 Cal
 App 3d 831, 82 Cal Rptr 61, 66 (1969).
 The three-judge court in Salyer did not make a separate determination that weighting
 votes according to assessed valuation was also necessary to attain the compelling state inter-
 est. The court merely observed that the benefita and burdens to each landowner were in
 proportion to assessed valuation "so permitting voting in the same proportion fairly distrib-
 utes the voting influence." Id. In a separate opinion, Judge Browning agreed that the use of
 assessments to finance district operations justified restricting the franchise to those with an
 interest in district land, but he found that lessees as well as owners had an interest sufficient
 to obtain the franchise. Id at 149-50 (Browning concurring in part and dissenting in part).
 He also found there was no compelling interest to support the weighting of votes according
 to assessed valuation, and he would have invalidated that provision. Id at 151-52.
 97 See, for example, Fallbrook Irrigation District v Bradley, 164 US 112 (1896).
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 formance justifies the discrimination in the provision of the
 franchise. By using rational basis review, the Supreme Court re-
 duced the burden on the state to justify its use of a local land-
 owner-controlled entity to address water problems in rural areas.
 Salyer thus returns to the state a measure of its traditional
 Hunter-style discretion to create and design local governments as
 state instruments for the management of localized problems.
 Third, perhaps the most striking feature of the arrangement
 sustained in Salyer is the allotment of votes according to assessed
 valuation. Although property ownership as a qualification for vot-
 ing has a long history in this country, votes were generally not al-
 lotted according to the amount or value of the property owned. In
 the municipal bond franchise cases, each property owner or tax-
 payer cast just one vote. Property ownership signalled that the
 voter had an economic stake in the community, and reflected the
 belief that the economic independence conferred by property own-
 ership was a source of political independence.98 But there was no
 assumption that the benefits of property ownership for improved
 deliberation and decisionmaking were scaled to the amount of
 property a person owned. Indeed, in the Tulare Lake district the
 use of assessment-weighted voting actually tended to cancel out
 the participation of most landowners because one corporation
 owned enough property in the district to command a majority of
 the votes, and the four largest owners together garnered approxi-
 mately eighty-five percent.99 Valuation-based voting could effec-
 tively disenfranchise small landowners. With the enfranchisement
 of nonresident corporate landowners and the use of valuation-
 based voting, water storage district voting resembles the voting ar-
 rangements of a private corporation or a cooperative.100
 98 See, for example, Christopher Collier, The American People as Christian White Men
 of Property: Suffrage and Elections in Colonial and Early National America, in Donald W.
 Rogers, ed, Voting and the Spirit of American Democracy: Essays on the History of Voting
 and Voting Rights in America 19, 22-23 (Illinois, 1992). As Gordon Wood has recently ob-
 served, in late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century republican thought, "prop-
 erty was designed to protect its holders from external influence or corruption, to free them
 from the scramble of buying and selling, and to allow them to make impartial political judg-
 ments." Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 269 (Random House
 1991). In other words, the property qualification was seen as a means of creating a disinter-
 ested electorate, not a restriction of the franchise to interested voters.
 9 Salyer, 410 US at 735 (Douglas dissenting). Indeed, there had not been an election
 for several decades. Id.
 100 See Robert B. Hawkins, Jr., Self-Government By District: Myth and Reality 93
 (Hoover Institution, 1976) (describing California's rural water districts as user cooperatives).
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 Salyer's acceptance of the proprietary model of local govern-
 ment was tacit, not express. Although the Court emphasized the
 close nexus of financial burdens and the franchise, the Court did
 not actually liken the district to a private corporation or coopera-
 tive. The sense of the opinion is that in a rural area without a local
 political community the state could discharge its responsibility for
 dealing with agricultural water management through an entity con-
 trolled by the owners of the lands that would finance and benefit
 from the state's arrangements.
 Salyer left lower courts confused. Some interpreted the case
 expansively and permitted states to limit the franchise in a special
 district to landowners whenever landowner payments are the pri-
 mary source of district revenues.101 Other courts read Salyer nar-
 rowly, finding that Kramer's strict scrutiny, rather than Salyer's
 more relaxed review, still framed the inquiry in local government
 voting cases. For these courts, Salyer concerned the supply of
 water to agricultural land, and Kramer still governed for special
 districts operating in urban areas or providing services for house-
 holds rather than agriculture.102 These courts also followed City of
 Phoenix's analysis of economic burdens and found that assessment
 payors were not disproportionately affected by a special district if
 the district also collected user charges or if the burden of assess-
 ments was passed along to other area residents through rents and
 the prices of goods and services.103
 In Ball v James,104 decided eight years after Salyer, the Su-
 preme Court expanded Salyer's reach and fully established the
 model of the proprietary government exempt from the require-
 ments of local democratic representation. Ball, however, was no
 clearer than Salyer in indicating when the proprietary model
 applies.
 "I See, for example, Phillippart v Hotchkiss Tract Reclamation District 799, 54 Cal
 App 3d 797, 127 Cal Rptr 42, 43-44 (1975); Simi Valley Recreation & Parks District v
 LAFCO of Ventura County, 51 Cal App 3d 648, 124 Cal Rptr 635, 655-57 (1975); Chesser v
 Buchanan, 193 Colo 471, 568 P2d 39, 41 (1977) (tunnel improvement district).
 102 See, for example, Choudhry v Free, 17 Cal 3d 660, 131 Cal Rptr 654, 552 P2d 438,
 442-43 (1976) (district with 100,000 urban residents exempted from Salyer); Johnson v Lew-
 iston Orchards Irrigation District, 99 Idaho 501, 584 P2d 646, 649-50 (1978) (district lo-
 cated almost entirely within the City of Lewiston and principally engaged in providing do-
 mestic water to residents of Lewiston exempt from Salyer). See also Wright v Town Bd. of
 Town of Carlton, 41 AD2d 290, 342 NYS2d 577 (1973), afrd 33 NY2d 977, 353 NYS2d 739
 (1974) (water district to serve the most populated areas of the town).
 103 See, for example, Choudhry, 552 P2d at 442-43; Johnson, 584 P2d at 649-50; In re
 Extension of Boundaries of Glaize Creek Sewer Dist. of Jefferson Co., 574 SW2d 357, 363
 (Mo 1978); Wright, 342 NYS2d at 581.
 104 451 US 355 (1981).
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 18:56:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1993] One Person/One Vote 367
 Ball concerned the Salt River Project Agricultural Improve-
 ment and Power District, a water reclamation district in central
 Arizona. Like the Tulare Lake Basin district, the Salt River dis-
 trict stores and delivers water to landowners within the district's
 borders. The district is managed by a locally elected board, with
 only landowners permitted to vote, and their votes weighted ac-
 cording to the extent of their holdings.106 The Salt River district,
 however, differed from the Tulare Lake Basin district in the nature
 of the community served, the extent of its powers, the source of its
 financing, and its overall impact.
 Although the area was originally agricultural, at the time of
 the Ball litigation the Salt River district was substantially urban,
 encompassing nine incorporated municipalities including the city
 of Phoenix.106 Nearly half of the land in the district was urban, and
 approximately forty percent of its water went to non-agricultural
 users.107 In addition to storing and distributing water, the district
 generated and sold electric power, and approximately ninety per-
 cent of the district's 240,000 electric consumers were residential
 customers.108 Although the statute creating the district authorizes
 it to raise money through assessments proportionate to acreage
 and to issue bonds secured by liens on the real property in the
 district, nearly all of the district's revenues, including the funds for
 servicing its debts, came from sales of electricity.109
 The Salt River district was, in terms of revenues and expendi-
 tures, one of the five largest special districts in the United
 States.110 Even without the formal powers of a general purpose
 government, the district, as one commentator recently found, has a
 broad impact over the metropolitan area-"vastly more influence
 over the lives of the people of Phoenix than do most conventional
 governments."'11 In Arizona, "water is the linchpin of the uni-
 106 Id at 359. Prior to 1969, voting power for district elections was apportioned accord-
 ing to acreage, with owners of less than one acre ineligible to vote. In 1969, owners of less
 than one acre were permitted to cast fractional votes in proportion to their acreage. In 1976,
 the board of directors was enlarged from 10 to 14 members. The original ten members were
 elected from geographic divisions within the district, with landowners voting according to
 acreage; the four new members were elected at large, with each landowner in the district
 having one vote in the at-large election. The district also had a president and a vice presi-
 dent elected at large on an acreage-weighted basis. Id at 359 n 2.
 106 See Comment, Voter Restrictions in Special Districts: A Case Study of the Salt
 River Project, 1969 L & Soc Order (Ariz St L J) 636, 658.
 107 De Young, 1982 Ariz St L J at 445 (cited in note 80).
 108 Id.
 109 Ball, 451 US at 360, 370 n 19.
 110 Comment, 1969 L & Soc Order at 649 (cited in note 106).
 111 Joel Garreau, Edge City: Life on the New Frontier 193 (Anchor/Doubleday, 1991).
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 verse," and the district, with its control over water and electricity
 prices, juggled the competing demands of urban residents, indus-
 try, agricultural users, and recreation.112 At the time of the Ball
 litigation, the district subsidized agricultural water users with reve-
 nues from the sale of electricity.113
 In Ball, the Supreme Court determined that despite the Salt
 River district's considerable influence over the development of
 metropolitan Phoenix, the district "simply does not exercise the
 sort of governmental powers that invoke" strict scrutiny of restric-
 tions on the franchise.114 Despite its extensive activities and eco-
 nomic clout, the district's "primary and originating purpose"-the
 storage, conservation, and delivery of water-was "relatively nar-
 row."115 The district's power over flood control was merely "inci-
 dental" to its primary water function and, thus, "not of decisive
 constitutional significance."'16 Nor did the district's ability to gen-
 erate and sell power broaden the nature of its governmental func-
 tions, because "the provision of electricity is not a traditional ele-
 ment of governmental sovereignty . . . and so is not in-itself the
 sort of general or important governmental function that would
 make the government provider" subject to one person/one vote.117
 The Court established the requisite nexus between district im-
 pact and the enfranchised constituency by focusing on the contin-
 gent liability of the district's landowners. Although most of the
 district's revenues came from non-landowners and it was unlikely
 that the district would ever have to impose a lien on district lands
 in order to repay its debts, the voting landowners "are the only
 residents of the District whose lands are subject to liens to secure
 District bonds" and the only ones subject to the district's power to
 levy acreage-based taxes.118 The Court acknowledged that non-
 landowners would be affected by district operations, but held there
 was no requirement that the enfranchised group "be the only par-
 ties at all affected by the operations of the entity. "119
 Ball crystallized the model of the proprietary local govern-
 ment. According to the Court, the district was only a "nominal"
 112 Id.
 113 DeYoung, 1982 Ariz St L J at 445-46 (cited in note 80); Comment, 1969 L & Soc
 Order at 660 (cited in note 106).
 114 Ball, 451 US at 366.
 "'I Id at 367.
 11 Id at 367 n 12, citing Salyer, 410 US at 728 n 8.
 117 Id at 368.
 118 Id at 370.
 "19 Id at 371.
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 public entity. It had a sufficiently "public character" that it could
 avoid state taxes, sell tax-exempt bonds, condemn property within
 its borders, and not be subject to the state's regulatory oversight of
 public utilities.120 But the district's "public character" was purely
 formal; it was "essentially" a "business enterprise, created by and
 chiefly benefiting a specific group of landowners."'121 In fact, the
 district had two kinds of business-like relationships. The district
 sold water and electric power to area residents. But the mere fact
 that these consumer-residents were affected by the district's busi-
 ness activities did not give them a claim to representation in its
 governance. 122 The district, however, also had "investors"-the
 landowners within the jurisdiction whose lands were subject to the
 district's power to impose land-based taxation and who might be
 at risk for the district's obligations.123 The Court determined that
 the state could treat the district like a proprietary enterprise and
 vest governance in the landowner-investors.
 Local government as business enterprise gave the Court a new
 framework for considering questions of local government organiza-
 tion, thereby increasing the discretion accorded the states in the
 creation of locally representative public entities. If a local govern-
 ment is a business enterprise, then the organizing principles for
 political bodies-universal adult resident enfranchisement and
 equal population representation-need not apply. With the propri-
 etary enterprise model as an option, a state may design a local gov-
 ernment to be responsive and accountable to just a limited group
 within the locality without having to prove that the restriction on
 the franchise or the bias in local representation is narrowly focused
 on all those interested in the local government and necessary to
 the furtherance of a compelling state interest. Moreover, although
 based on the notion that the restrictive franchise is justified by the
 landowners' stake in the special district enterprise, proprietary
 governments are not, in turn, subject to a rigid requirement that
 votes actually reflect the extent of a landowner's potential liability.
 Proprietary governments may use assessment-based voting, acre-
 age-based voting, or even one owner/one vote for qualified
 owners.124
 120 Id at 359-60, 368 n 14.
 121 Id at 368.
 122 Id at 370.
 123 Id.
 124 See, for example, Southern California Rapid Transit District v Bolen, 1 Cal 4th
 654, 3 Cal Rptr 2d 843, 822 P2d 875, 889-90 (1992) (in a special-benefit assessment district
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 18:56:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 370 The University of Chicago Law Review [60:339
 The proprietary model is not a simple return to local govern-
 ment as state instrumentality. It validates governance only by
 those within the community who can be seen as investors. For a
 district with power to impose assessments on land, the investor
 group will consist of landowners. Although the Salt River district
 landowners did not bear the current economic burdens of the dis-
 trict, they were contingently liable for the district's obligations and
 were subject to the district's formal power to tax. In effect, Ball
 reversed the assumptions of City of Phoenix. Whereas in the dem-
 ocratic/governmental model, the nominal and contingent burdens
 of landowners were not enough to support a limitation on the
 franchise because costs were shared by other members of the com-
 munity, in the proprietary setting contingent liability suffices to
 support an exclusive franchise for landowners, notwithstanding the
 potentially broad diffusion of costs throughout the district.
 B. Choosing the Democratic or the Proprietary Model
 Salyer and Ball cite two criteria for distinguishing proprietary
 from democratic local governments: the disproportionate impact of
 the district on landowners and the special limited purpose of the
 district. Neither criterion is analytically sound. The first is circular
 and the second can be arbitrary. The result has been confusion,
 coupled with a modest trend to expand the scope of the proprie-
 tary model to encompass special districts created to finance a
 broad range of urban infrastructure and public facilities.
 1. Disproportionate impact.
 The Supreme Court has provided two methods of assessing
 the impact of a local government's action in determining whether
 the franchise can be limited to a particular constituency. In the
 local democracy cases, those benefitted by the locality's perform-
 ance of its services (or injured by defective or inadequate perform-
 ance), and not only those who bear the district's costs, are consid-
 with voting limited to commercial landowners, state legislature may adopt differing formu-
 las for the allotment of votes and tne calculation of assessments).
 A proprietary government may also appoint representatives to its governing board from
 internal subunits of different populations without running afoul of the one person/one vote
 requirement. See Concerned Citizens of Southern Ohio v Ohio Pine Creek Conservancy
 District, 473 F Supp 334, 337-38 (S D Ohio 1977). But see Salyer, 342 F Supp at 146-47
 (invalidating election divisions within the Tulare Lake Basin district where assessed valua-
 tion differed sharply among the divisions; the Supreme Court did not address the malappor-
 tionment in terms of interdivision differences in assessed valuation).
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 ered persons affected by or interested in the district's government.
 The local democracy cases utilize an expansive definition of eco-
 nomic impact and assume that those who initially pay local gov-
 ernment taxes or assessments will pass those costs on to others so
 that the incidence of local financing is diffused throughout the
 community. The community as a whole is, thus, deemed affected
 by the local government. Few, if any, can maintain that they are so
 disproportionately affected by local action as to justify a represen-
 tative scheme that benefits them. Even if landowner property is
 subject to liens in the event that the local government is unable to
 meet its obligations, the imposition of a lien will be treated as too
 remote a contingency to sustain a restriction on the franchise.
 The proprietary model's method of assessing impact, as exem-
 plified in Salyer and, especially, Ball, is to consider only those who
 bear the economic burdens of the local government's actions, not
 those whose sole interest is in its services. This alternative defines
 economic burden to include only those who are subject to assess-
 ments-ignoring the fees paid by non-landowner consumers of the
 district's services and costs passed along to the tenants or custom-
 ers of landowners, and emphasizing the contingent liability of
 those whose lands may be subject to lien, regardless of how pros-
 perous the district is or how unlikely it is that a lien will ever be
 imposed.
 Thus, whether a district's actions have a disproportionate im-
 pact on a landowner constituency will turn on whether dispropor-
 tionate impact is viewed through a proprietary or a democratic
 lens; yet the presence or absence of a disproportionate impact on
 landowners is supposed to determine whether the proprietary or
 democratic framework is applied. The analysis is entirely circular.
 2. Special limited purpose.
 The real work of distinguishing democratic from proprietary
 governments, then, must rely upon the notion of a special limited
 purpose. Some cases will be easy. Precedent clearly requires that
 elections in county and municipal governments and in districts
 that provide educational services"2" be based on the local democ-
 racy model.
 126 See also Ball, 451 US at 372 n 1 (Powell concurring) (Hadley and Kramer "reflect
 the Court's judgment as to the unique importance of education among the functions of mod-
 ern local government").
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 In Fumarolo v Chicago Board of Education,126 the Illinois Su-
 preme Court recently found that Kramer and Hadley continued to
 apply, notwithstanding Salyer and Ball, when it invalidated the
 franchise and representation provisions of the Chicago School Re-
 form Act. The Act provided for the creation of local school councils
 with a variety of powers for each of the grammar and high schools
 in the Chicago school system.127 Each council was to consist of ten
 members, with parents of children enrolled in the local school to
 elect six of their number, community residents to elect two resi-
 dents, and local school teachers to elect two teachers.128 In invali-
 dating the exclusion of non-parent residents from the electorate
 for most council seats, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that
 the councils' role in local education placed them outside the reach
 of the Salyer-Ball exemption and mandated the application of
 strict scrutiny.129
 Fumarolo underscores the degree to which the Salyer-Ball ex-
 emption is based upon a "proprietary" model of local government
 and not just a willingness to focus the franchise and representation
 in special districts on the special constituency of the districts. The
 proprietary model was unavailable in Fumarolo in part because the
 parents, although the primary consumers of local school services,
 could not be seen as "investors" in the council. As the court
 pointed out, "the cost of operating the community's schools falls
 directly or indirectly on virtually all community residents, for ex-
 ample, property taxes are imposed on all residents regardless of
 whether they have children attending the schools."1130 It is unlikely
 126 142 Ill 2d 54, 566 NE2d 1283 (1990).
 127 These powers included the hiring and evaluation of the principal, the recommenda-
 tion of textbooks and disciplinary and attendance policies, the evaluation of teaching re-
 sources, and the review of the principal's expenditure plan. Fumarolo, 566 NE2d at 1295.
 128 Id at 1287.
 129 In defending the restricted franchise, the Chicago Board of Education contended
 that the local school councils were advisory rather than governing bodies. The Court deter-
 mined that, although the district councils lacked the power to levy taxes or set basic educa-
 tional policy for local schools, their functions were more than advisory, and the councils had
 considerable authority over local school operations. Id at 1295-98.
 130 Id at 1298. Fumarolo also followed Kramer and Hadley in assuming a pervasive
 effect of council operations on all community residents and a presumptive interest of all
 residents in educational activities. Id. As a result, "[i]t simply cannot be said that the activi-
 ties and the performance of the local school council have a sufficiently disproportionate ef-
 fect on those parents with children in current attendance at the public school" to justify the
 preference for parents and the discrimination against nonparent residents in representation
 on the local school councils. Id at 1298-99. The Court suggested that if a rational basis test
 had been applied the preference for parents might have survived, because "there may be a
 rational relationship between giving parents of children currently attending the public
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 that beneficiaries of special district services can obtain special or
 exclusive representation in special district governance where they
 do not also bear the economic burdens of district operations. The
 proprietary model can only empower landowners or other taxpay-
 ers seen to have an economic stake in the "enterprise. 1'131
 Even for districts that provide just one or a handful of services
 and that have a landowner or taxpayer constituency, Ball and
 Salyer provide no theory for distinguishing general governmental
 functions from special limited purposes. Rather, the Court has
 proffered a laundry list of powers and "normal functions of govern-
 ment"-imposition of ad valorem taxes or sales taxes, enactment
 of laws governing the conduct of citizens, and the "maintenance of
 streets, the operation of schools, or sanitation, health, or welfare
 services."132
 The Court's reference to ad valorem taxation as governmental,
 and its treatment of the special districts in Salyer and Ball, which
 were financed by special assessments, as proprietary, has led some
 lower courts and commentators to treat the taxation/assessment
 distinction as critical.133 The similarities of taxation and assess-
 ment as indicia of governmental power, however, are greater than
 their differences. Both taxation and assessment are coercive. The
 assessment, like the ad valorem tax, is a compulsory charge that
 can be imposed without the consent of the payor.134 Moreover, the
 assessment has long been widely used by both general purpose and
 limited purpose governments to finance the construction and
 maintenance of public infrastructure and other public improve-
 school an increased role in local educational governance and improvement in the school." Id
 at 1299-1300.
 131 See also Cunningham v Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 751 F Supp 885 (W
 D Wash 1990) (district that provides water pollution abatement and public transportation
 functions; departure from one person/one vote for geographic reasons not protected by pro-
 prietary principle).
 132 Ball, 451 US at 366.
 133 See, for example, William A. Garton, One Person, One Vote in Special District
 Elections: Two Ideas and an Illustration, 20 SD L Rev 245, 258-61 (1975) (arguing that the
 difference between the power to tax and the power to levy special assessments explains why
 the court could reach different results in Cipriano and City of Phoenix, on the one hand,
 than it did in Salyer, on the other); Foster v Sunnyside Valley Irrigation District, 102
 Wash 2d 395, 687 P2d 841, 850 (1984) (district engaged in the delivery of irrigation water
 and the generation of electric power exempt from federal one person/one vote requirement
 because "it is not empowered to impose ad valorem property or sales taxes, enact laws gov-
 erning the conduct of citizens or administer the normal functions of government").
 134 San Marcos Water District v San Marcos Unified School District, 42 Cal 3d 154,
 228 Cal Rptr 47, 720 P2d 935 (1986).
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 ments.135 Indeed, by definition, a special assessment can only be
 imposed to fund a local public benefit.138 This combination of coer-
 cive means and public ends indicates that assessments are as gov-
 ernmental as ad valorem taxation.
 Nor is it obvious why "sanitation, health, or welfare services"
 are more normal functions of government than the storage and dis-
 tribution of water. There are more than 3,000 local governments
 specially created to address water management functions.137 How
 can a governmental activity so widespread not be a normal func-
 tion of government?138 It may be that the existence of private
 providers of water undercuts the appreciation of the extent of pub-
 lic water storage and distribution activity,139 but surely the deter-
 136 See Eugene McQuillin, 14 The Law of Municipal Corporations ch 38 (Callaghan, 3d
 ed, 1987); C. Dallas Sands and Michael E. Libonati, 4 Local Government Law ? 24.01 (Cal-
 laghan, 1982); Oliver Oldman and Ferdinand P. Schoettle, State and Local Taxes and Fi-
 nance 412-16 (Foundation Press, 1974). See also Bolen, 822 P2d at 877-78 (citing uses of
 special assessment in California to fund construction of drains and sewers, residential subdi-
 visions, gas distribution works, flood control projects, the redevelopment of blighted areas,
 and the construction of a transit tunnel).
 136 McQuillin, 14 Municipal Corporations ? 38.11 (cited in note 135). The owner of
 land subject to assessment can require the assessing government to prove that the program
 funded by the assessment actually benefits the owner to the extent of the assessment as a
 condition for the assessment. Ad valorem taxpayers have no similar right to demand that
 taxation be conditioned on special benefits. But the right of assessment payors that pay-
 ment be limited by benefit does not exempt them from the obligation to pay for a benefit
 they would rather not have. Id. See also Garton, 20 SD L Rev at 258-61 (cited in note 133).
 137 See Colman, Public-Private Partnerships at 22 (cited in note 78) (in 1987 there
 were 3,056 single-purpose governments with a function concerning water supply, and more
 than 5,600 that dealt with either water alone or water in combination with sewage).
 138 A survey, conducted by the International City Management Association, of the chief
 administrative officers of 3,200 municipal governments-that is, cities and not special dis-
 tricts-found that 77.7% assumed some responsibility for the provision of water. See Robert
 M. Stein, Urban Alternatives: Public and Private Markets in the Provision of Local Ser-
 vices 53, 64 (Pittsburgh, 1990) (table 3.5).
 The formation of water districts often reflects one of the basic motivations for the crea-
 tion of any coercive government program-that persons benefitted by an activity be com-
 pelled to pay for it. As Hawkins explains,
 [i]n the case of land-voting districts, many would argue that since the benefits accrue
 only to a small group of individuals the activity should be privately undertaken, but in
 water projects such voluntary efforts are not always effective and responsive to the
 interests of all who benefit. An example is an irrigation district in which, as more water
 is transported to an area and spread over increasing amounts of land, the water table
 begins to rise; some individuals will benefit by staying out of the district and will capi-
 talize on the rising water table. When a public entity is formed, free riders share
 equally in costs for benefits received.
 Hawkins, Self-Government by District at 64 (cited in note 100).
 139 Ball summarily dismissed the significance of the Salt River district's power distribu-
 tion activities in assessing whether the district was a governmental or proprietary govern-
 ment, citing a case involving a regulated private utility and asserting that the provision of
 electric power is not "a traditional element of governmental sovereignty." 451 US at 368,
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 mination of whether a public service is a normal function of gov-
 ernment cannot turn on the absence of private sector alternatives,
 lest the role of private security forces, private carting services, and
 private schools undermine the "governmentalness" of the tradi-
 tional governmental functions concerning public safety, sanitation,
 and primary education.
 In determining whether an entity is a state actor subject to the
 constraints of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has placed
 considerable emphasis on the formal status of the actor and has
 increasingly tended to exempt private individuals and firms from
 treatment as state actors even when they perform important func-
 tions. It is not clear why the formal status of a political subdivision
 should not be comparably dispositive when the local franchise is at
 stake. Certainly, as Hadley recognized, it would avoid the inher-
 ently arbitrary task of determining which activities a government
 undertakes are "normal governmental functions" and which are
 not-a task complicated by the Court's disinterest in the positive
 evidence that a large number of governments undertake certain
 presumptively nongovernmental functions, such as supplying water
 and power.
 There is no natural or functional distinction between "sanita-
 tion, health, or welfare services" and water and power.140 Not sur-
 prisingly, lower courts have on occasion experienced difficulty in
 determining whether certain functions are governmental or propri-
 etary. Is the provision of sewage disposal or garbage collection an
 aspect of the public health function, and thus governmental, or is
 it special and limited like water storage and irrigation?"4' What of
 government activity concerning transportation? Is road mainte-
 citing Jackson v Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 US 345, 353 (1974). As with water, a sizeable
 fraction of municipalities assume some responsibilities with respect to the provision of elec-
 tricity. Stein, Urban Alternatives at 64 (cited in note 138) (table 3.5; 43.8% of municipali-
 ties surveyed have some responsibilities concerning electricity).
 140 Indeed, the availability of water and power may have implications for local sanita-
 tion and health.
 141 See, for example, Goldstein v Mitchell, 144 Ill App 3d 474, 494 NE2d 914, 920-21
 (1986) (Illinois may limit franchise to landowners in drainage district, which has powers to
 levy assessments; incur debt, manage erosion and flooding, and collect and dispose of sew-
 age); Lane v Town of Oyster Bay, 149 Misc 2d 237, 564 NYS2d 655 (Sup Ct 1990) (referen-
 dum on whether to extend boundaries of sanitation collection district limited to owners of
 taxable real property).
 When faced with a special district that provided residential water and sewer service and
 had the power to pass misdemeanor ordinances concerning those services, a California ap-
 pellate court determined that the district was neither a proprietary government nor a gen-
 eral purpose government and proceeded to develop its own standard of review that would
 permit both residential and landowner voting. Bjornestad v Hulse, 229 Cal App 3d 1568,
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 nance142 or tunnel construction'" or mass transit"' more like "san-
 itation, health, or welfare services" or more like water storage? Can
 these questions be meaningfully answered?
 Following Ball, lower courts extended the reach of the proprie-
 tary model.145 Recently, courts have applied the proprietary model
 to special districts created to finance urban infrastructure. The
 Florida Supreme Court, for example, sustained a state statute pro-
 viding for the election, on a one acre/one vote basis, of the board of
 supervisors of a community development district.146 The district is
 basically a device for developers to finance streets, drainage, and
 sewers on the urban fringe to improve the marketability of their
 developments.147 The Florida court determined that the district's
 powers "implement the single, narrow legislative purpose of ensur-
 ing that future growth in this State will be complemented by an
 adequate community infrastructure."1148 The financing of basic
 community infrastructure was not an "exercise [of] general govern-
 mental functions."1149 In effect, financing itself was treated as a spe-
 cial limited purpose, regardless of the nature or extent of the facili-
 ties financed. As a result, it was easy to limit the franchise to
 landowners "because they are the ones who must bear the initial
 281 Cal Rptr 548 (1991) (applying rational basis test to statute that enfranchised nonresi-
 dent landowners).
 142 See, for example, Stelzel v South Indian River Water Control District, 486 S2d 65,
 66 (Fla App 1986) (Florida may provide for "vote-by-acreage" for the operation of water
 control district that also has authority to construct, maintain, improve, and repair roads).
 143 Chesser, 568 P2d 39.
 144 Southern California Rapid Transit District v Bolen, 235 Cal App 3d 134, 269 Cal
 Rptr 147, 155 (1990) ("Public transportation, like public education, is an issue affecting all
 citizens."), rev'd 822 P2d 875.
 14b See, for example, Goldstein, 494 NE2d at 918 (Ball "significantly expanded"
 Salyer); Esler v Walters, 56 NY2d 306, 452 NYS2d 333, 437 NE2d 1090 (1982) (treating
 Ball as expanding Salyer, and thus overturning Wright v Town Bd. of Town of Carlton, 33
 NY2d 977, 353 NYS2d 739 (1974), 309 NE2d 137, affirming 41 AD2d 290, 342 NYS2d 577
 (1973), which had held that restrictions on the franchise in a special district that supplied
 drinking water are subject to strict scrutiny, and holding that voting arrangements in a
 water district in which it is landowners whose property alone is subject to assessments and
 to liens for delinquencies are exempt from strict scrutiny).
 148 State v Frontier Acres Community Development District Pasco County, 472 S2d
 455 (Fla 1985). The district's powers include the issuance of bonds to finance the construc-
 tion and acquisition of streets, drainage, and sewers. The bonds would be backed by special
 assessments against lands in the district. Id at 456.
 147 See generally Perrenod, Special Districts, Special Purposes at 12-43 (cited in note
 79) (discussing ability of developers to create and control urban fringe special districts that
 finance new infrastructure but ultimately pass costs on to future residents or annexing
 cities).
 148 Frontier Acres, 472 S2d at 457.
 149 Id.
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 burden of the district's costs."'50 If disproportionate impact may
 consist in ownership of land subject to assessments and contingent
 liability for the district's obligations, and if financing may itself be
 a special limited purpose when the funds are provided by assess-
 ments, then there is considerable potential for the use of the pro-
 prietary model to sustain limitations on the franchise to landown-
 ers when the funding of local public infrastructure is at issue.
 3. Proprietary governments in general government settings.
 Southern California Rapid Transit District v Bolen nicely il-
 lustrates the difficulty of determining whether a particular local
 election falls within the democratic or the proprietary paradigm, as
 well as the growing use of the proprietary model to justify land-
 owner voting in a general government setting. California author-
 ized the Southern California Rapid Transit District ("SCRTD") to
 create special benefit assessment districts to defray part of the
 costs of construction of a planned rapid transit line connecting
 downtown Los Angeles to North Hollywood. On the theory that
 the rail system would specially benefit landowners within a certain
 distance of the new rail stations, the SCRTD created two districts
 and sought to impose special assessments based on square footage
 on commercial parcels and improvements in the districts.151 Under
 California law, the assessments were subject to referendum, but
 only owners of real property subject to the assessment could vote,
 with votes allotted on the basis of the assessed value of the real
 property in the district.152
 Must the special assessment election be run on democratic
 lines or could the state limit participation in the assessment refer-
 endum to landowners? The ten California appellate judges who
 heard the case split evenly. The three judges of the Court of Ap-
 150 Id. See also Bolen, 822 P2d at 884 (vote on referendum to create special benefit
 assessment districts to fund a portion of rapid transit system may be limited to owners of
 commercial real property: "The narrow purpose for which the districts are established is
 reflected in a voting scheme that limits the franchise to those who will directly and primar-
 ily enjoy the benefits of transit station siting and shoulder the reciprocal burden of assess-
 ments-owners of commercial property.").
 Ibl The SCRTD originally proposed to impose the assessment on all land in the district,
 but the Los Angeles City Council conditioned its consent to the assessment on the exemp-
 tion of residential property. Bolen, 269 Cal Rptr at 150-51.
 152 Qualified owners could cast one vote for each $1000 of real property in the assess-
 ment district. Id at 152. One aspect of the challenge to the property-based franchise was
 that assessments would be based on parcel size or floor area whereas votes in the referen-
 dum would be based on assessed valuation. Thus, "property owners with the most votes do
 not necessarily pay the highest assessments." Id.
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 peal, and two of the seven judges of the state Supreme Court,
 found the special assessment election controlled by Kramer, Cipri-
 ano, and especially City of Phoenix.'58 These judges saw the dis-
 trict's function as the provision of transportation, and "public
 transportation, like public education, is an issue affecting all citi-
 zens."'"14 Thus a restriction on the referendum franchise would be
 subject to strict scrutiny. Nor did the special assessment dispro-
 portionately affect landowners. As in City of Phoenix, the entire
 community would benefit from the facility funded by the assess-
 ment.'"6 Further, these judges assumed that the commercial land-
 owners who pay the assessment will be able to "redistribute the
 burden to other commercial residents."'56 Thus, neither prong of
 the Salyer-Ball test applied, and strict scrutiny of the franchise
 restriction mandated extension of the franchise to others within
 the assessment districts.'57
 The five-member majority on the California Supreme Court,
 however, framed the case entirely within the proprietary paradigm.
 Although they agreed with the lower court and the high court dis-
 senters that public transportation is a general governmental func-
 tion, the majority stressed the distinction between the transit dis-
 trict, an appointive body, which "of course is invested with and
 exercises substantial governmental powers, "158 and the special as-
 sessment districts, which "lack virtually any of the incidents of
 government."1519 Those judges saw the "narrow purpose" of the
 special assessment district not as transportation but simply as "the
 recoupment of some of the added economic value conferred on
 commercial property resulting from its proximity to the transit
 stations."'60 The Supreme Court majority then applied the propri-
 etary analysis of disproportionate impact and found the tight
 linkage of economic burden and the franchise dispositive. Although
 nonvoting residents of the districts, like Southern California resi-
 dents living outside the assessment districts, would be affected by
 111 Id at 153-57; Bolen, 822 P2d at 895-96 (Kennard dissenting).
 134 Bolen, 269 Cal Rptr at 155.
 133 Bolen, 822 P2d at 895 (Kennard dissenting).
 138 Id at 896. See also Bolen, 269 Cal Rptr at 156-57.
 167 The Court of Appeal considered whether the unconstitutional restriction on the
 franchise might be severed from the statutory rapid transit financing scheme but concluded
 that the legislature "would not have enacted the special assessment law ... without [] some
 provision for a referendum election." Bolen, 269 Cal Rptr at 158. The dissenters on the
 Supreme Court did not reach the issue.
 138 Bolen, 822 P2d at 884 (emphasis in original).
 139 Id at 883.
 1B0 Id at 884.
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 the rail system financed by the assessments, they would "bear no
 discernably direct financial burden as a result of the
 assessments."161
 At the heart of the division in Bolen was a disagreement over
 whether to determine the "governmental" nature of the special as-
 sessment district in isolation or in relation to the general govern-
 mental SCRTD. The Supreme Court majority focused exclusively
 on the special assessment districts and found them "little more
 than formalistic, geographically defined perimeters whose raison
 d'etre is to serve as the conceptual medium" for imposing an as-
 sessment on those whose property would benefit from the rapid
 transit system.162 The special assessment district was a fundraising
 device, not a government. Therefore, democratic norms did not ap-
 ply and the franchise could be limited to those commercial prop-
 erty owners obligated to "invest" in the district through the pay-
 ment of assessments.
 The Supreme Court dissenters agreed that a benefit assess-
 ment district "is merely a geographical area within the SCRTD's
 borders identified by the Board for the purpose of imposing the
 assessment."1163 But they drew the opposite conclusion for the allo-
 cation of the franchise. For them, the SCRTD, which created the
 assessment districts, imposed and collected the assessments, and
 would conduct any assessment referendum, was the relevant gov-
 ernmental body. Following City of Phoenix, a referendum con-
 ducted by such a government is subject to the franchise rules of
 the democratic model.164
 In Bolen, then, the analytical indeterminacy that marks the
 governmental/proprietary distinction was joined by a comparable
 uncertainty over whether to gauge the political effect and govern-
 mental role of a special district by looking at the particular district
 alone or in tandem with other local governments operating over
 the same territory. Ball permits courts to isolate special districts
 from the overlapping general purpose governments, although the
 Salt River district was certainly more than a mere fundraising de-
 vice. Given the ability of states to proliferate special districts that
 overlap more general urban governments, if those special districts
 are examined in isolation, they can be treated as proprietary gov-
 ernments even if their actions have considerable impact on the
 161 Id at 886.
 162 Id at 883.
 s Id at 894 (Kennard dissenting).
 I" Id at 894-95 (Kennard dissenting).
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 general governmental functions that are normally subject to demo-
 cratic control.
 Bolen underscores the significance of Ball in extending the
 proprietary model from the sparsely populated, exclusively agricul-
 tural setting of Salyer, where there may be no general purpose lo-
 cal government with powers adequate to the task,"6' to metropoli-
 tan areas where the service or facility in question could be
 provided by a democratically elected government. Ball and Bolen
 give the states considerable flexibility for deciding whether demo-
 cratic rules or landowner control will operate in a particular case,
 because the two very different models of government could apply
 to substantially similar, albeit formally distinct, local elections. A
 referendum on whether to impose an assessment on property to
 fund public improvements conducted by a general purpose govern-
 ment must be open to all eligible voters because it is assumed that
 the benefits and burdens of the improvement and assessment will
 be diffused throughout the jurisdiction. But if the state authorizes
 the general purpose government to create a special assessment dis-
 trict to assess landowners for the benefits they will receive from
 the public improvements that will be funded by the assessment,
 then as Bolen indicates, the assessment district may be treated as
 a proprietary government. It appears that City of Phoenix may be
 avoided by the creation of a local entity whose sole purpose is to
 conduct a referendum, although if a general purpose local govern-
 ment had conducted that election, City of Phoenix would apply.
 C. The Proprietary Model, Federalism, and the Local Vote
 As Part I indicates, the Avery-Hadley line is an obstacle to
 state efforts to give special or exclusive representation to particular
 local constituencies. The reasons for special representation range
 from policy (that control by the specially affected constituency
 would increase the effectiveness and efficiency of local government
 performance) to politics (that the special government could not be
 created without the special constituency's consent, and that con-
 sent was contingent on the constituency obtaining special repre-
 166 In the past, counties, the territorially pervasive local governments, may have lacked
 the powers necessary to finance and operate major capital facilities. With the strengthening
 of county government in recent years and with the potential for extending broader powers
 and administrative capacity to counties today, there should be adequate general purpose
 governments in most places and the case for a special exemption from general constitutional
 principles concerning voting and representation for districts in sparsely populated areas is
 increasingly problematic.
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 sentation or control of the local entity). The democratic model of
 local government requires strict scrutiny of deviations from the
 norm of universal enfranchisement and equally weighted votes. It
 departs form the traditional deference to the states with respect to
 the design of governmental structures for the delivery of local ser-
 vices. With the presumption of pervasive effects of local govern-
 ment action, strict scrutiny spells the elimination of many tradi-
 tional forms of local government.
 The proprietary model provides a partial escape from the ten-
 sion between political equality and federalism. By treating some
 local governments as governments only in name, and more like
 proprietary enterprises in fact, the Supreme Court carved out some
 creative space that allows states to design local units serving par-
 ticular constituencies without directly flouting Avery's extension of
 the political equality norm to local governments. Political equality
 will be rigidly enforced within "governmental" local governments
 while states can have considerable discretion to empower land-
 owner interests in "proprietary" local units. The problem, as in so
 many other settings, is the elusive nature of the governmental/pro-
 prietary distinction.166 Explicit balancing of incommensurable
 equality and federalism concerns has ostensibly been avoided in
 favor of sorting localities into general purpose and special purpose
 units. But the lack of a clear analytical distinction between general
 governmental functions and special limited purposes as well as the
 existence of local units like the assessment districts in Bolen that
 may plausibly fall into either category suggests that the balancing
 has only been subsumed into the deliberations of individual judges
 concerning which model to apply.
 The infrastructure financing cases, in particular, demonstrate
 the limited utility of the federal doctrinal framework in determin-
 ing whether voting rights will be governed by democratic or propri-
 etary rules. The special assessment and community development
 166 The governmental/proprietary distinction was "abandoned as untenable" in the
 field of intergovernmental tax immunities. South Carolina v Baker, 485 US 505, 523 n 14
 (1988), citing New York v United States, 326 US 572 (1946). It "proved no more fruitful in
 the field of regulatory immunity under the Commerce Clause." Garcia v San Antonio Met-
 ropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528, 543 (1985). In Garcia the Court determined that
 the distinction could not be the basis for a limited Tenth Amendment protection of the
 states from Congressional regulation. Id at 541-43. "The governmental-proprietary distinc-
 tion has faded into the background as the principal determinant of local government liabil-
 ity in tort" due to the "the confusion, universally acknowledged, in the judicial attempts to
 define what is governmental and what is proprietary." Daniel R. Mandelker, Dawn Clark
 Netsch, Peter W. Salsich, Jr., and Judith Welch Wegner, State and Local Government in a
 Federal System 455 (Michie, 3d ed, 1989).
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 district devices permit the manipulation of the structure of local
 elections and allow states to shift important local decisions from a
 democratic to a proprietary setting. Form may dominate over sub-
 stance when the special district financing mechanism is given pri-
 ority over the general purpose nature of the facility or service
 thereby financed. Given the lack of a clear distinction between
 general and special limited purposes, an infrastructure financing
 district can be seen as a limited purpose government. Within the
 framework of a district whose sole purpose is raising revenue it is
 easy to find that the assessment-payers or landowners have a
 greater stake in the district's activity than non-paying residents. In
 many cases, the only constraint on the state or local ability to shift
 from general popular control to landowner elections will be state
 law doctrines, such as those that bar the creation of "special com-
 missions" to perform municipal functions167 or that limit the types
 of local improvements that can be financed by the special
 assessment."68
 State and local governments may rely on special assessment
 districts to finance local public improvements for reasons other
 than voting rules. Special districts are frequently created to avoid
 state constitutional constraints on local taxation or borrowing.169
 State tax and debt limitations often target the ad valorem tax on
 real property. Typically, they may apply only to governments that
 have the power to impose the property tax,170 or they may only
 limit the property tax and obligations funded by the property
 tax.171 Governments without broader taxing authority or a special
 assessment that is defined as not a tax may be exempt from these
 restrictions on local government fiscal autonomy.172 With the
 167 See generally Chester James Antieau, 1 Municipal Corporation Law ? 2.11 (Mat-
 thew Bender, 1989).
 168 See, for example, Heavens v King County Rural Library District, 66 Wash 2d 558,
 404 P2d 453 (1965) (special assessment may not be used to fund a rural library because a
 library provides no special benefit to land).
 169 See, for example, Chicoine and Walzer, Governmental Structure at 71-72, 79, 220
 (cited in note 78).
 170 See, for example, Los Angeles County Transportation Commission v Richmond, 31
 Cal 3d 197, 182 Cal Rptr 324, 643 P2d 941 (1982) (Proposition 13 does not apply to special
 districts that do not have the power to levy a tax on real property).
 171 Mandelker, Netsch, Salsich and Wegner, State and Local Government at 353 (cited
 in note 166) (tax limits); id at 347-49 (debt limits); NY Const, Art 8 ? 4 (limits on local
 indebtedness based on percentages of average full valuation of local taxable real estate); id
 at Art 8 ? 10 (limits on real estate taxes).
 172 See, for example, Solvang Municipal Improvement District v Board of Supervisors
 of Santa Barbara County, 112 Cal App 3d 545, 169 Cal Rptr 391 (1980) (Proposition 13's
 limits on the property tax do not apply to special assessments.); County of Fresno v Malm-
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 spread of tax and debt limitations and of popular resistance to
 general tax increases, states and localities have turned to entities
 not subject to direct local popular control to undertake large-scale
 projects.173 The model of proprietary government preserves to
 states and localities the option of using special assessment districts
 controlled by developers or commercial landowners to finance
 costly capital improvements.
 The proprietary model is also a reminder of the widespread
 use of local government structures to circumvent direct popular
 control and facilitate the implementation of pro-business policies.
 Although much of the recent revival of interest in local govern-
 ment has focused on local government as a forum that enables peo-
 ple to participate in political decisionmaking,174 and to engage in
 the deliberative activities that constitute communities,175 much of
 the work of local governments, and of the rules of local government
 law, concerns the financing and operation of the public facilities
 necessary for local private economic activity.176 Local governments
 are economic as well as political units, and they may be devices for
 using the coercive power of the state for private economic ends.
 Contemporary local governments struggle to attract and retain
 businesses,177 often by financing the kinds of facilities they believe
 strom, 94 Cal App 3d 974, 156 Cal Rptr 777 (1979) (same). See also Sands and Libonati, 4
 Local Government Law ? 24.01 at 24-2 (cited in note 135) ("special assessments [ are usu-
 ally not subject to the restrictions imposed on general taxes").
 173 See, for example, Carolyn Teich Adams, Philadelphia: The Slide Toward Municipal
 Bankruptcy, in H.V. Savitch and John Clayton Thomas, eds, Big City Politics in Transition
 29, 33-34 (Sage, 1991) (discussing Philadelphia's increased use of independent development
 corporations and public authorities to finance large-scale projects; these entities "can borrow
 money without having the loan count against the municipality's total indebtedness" and
 "can insulate development projects from electoral pressure"); id at 42-43 (use of downtown
 special service districts in which downtown business owners pay extra taxes to fund extra
 services); M. Gottdiener, The Decline of Urban Politics: Political Theory and the Crisis of
 the Local State 283 (Sage, 1987) ("Special service districts, nonelective and quasipublic
 agencies, joint business/State commissions and programs emanating from higher levels of
 government, have all taken over functions that once were administered by more direct
 means of public participation."); Annmarie Hauck Walsh, Public Authorities and the Shape
 of Decision Making, in Bellush and Netzer, Urban Politics 188, 188-99 (cited in note 14)
 (special authorities in New York are "teeming" and are "more important sources of invest-
 ment in government-authorized projects than either state or city government").
 174 See, for example, Frug, 93 Harv L Rev 1057 (cited in note 3); Clayton P. Gillette,
 Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86 Mich L Rev
 930 (1988).
 175 See Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional
 Argument: Voting Rights, 41 Fla L Rev 443 (1989).
 170 See generally Paul E. Peterson, City Limits (Chicago, 1981).
 177 See, for example, Ann O'M. Bowman, The Visible Hand: Major Issues in City Eco-
 nomic Policy 7-8 (NLC Working Papers, Nov 1987) (86% of mayors surveyed identified
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 will promote private economic activity within local boundaries.178
 This local "public entrepreneurship"179 has affinities with the pro-
 prietary model. Businesses are seen as specially interested in and
 specially affected by local economic development activity. More-
 over, cities and states have sought to create and expand local orga-
 nizational forms such as the public authority, the public benefit
 corporation, the public-private partnership, or the special-service
 district180 that shift economic development decisionmaking away
 from popularly elected bodies to entities that are independent of
 direct popular control and look to the business community as their
 principal constituency."8" In many cases there is no formal conflict
 with the norms of the democratic model of local governance be-
 cause these institutions may not be elective, may be entirely pri-
 vate, or may be nominally subordinate to democratically elected
 city councils or state legislatures. In practice, however, many of
 these local government structures tend to shift decisions regarding
 economic development outside the realm of one person/one vote.
 The development and expansion of the proprietary model mir-
 rors this willingness to give powerful business groups an enhanced
 role in local economic development programs. Local governance
 and local policymaking are complex mixtures of allocational, redis-
 tributive, and economic development activities. The proprietary
 model both confirms the place of business-oriented concepts in the
 design and function of local governments and signals that federal
 constitutional law concerning the right to vote may not be able to
 provide a basis for challenging the state and local structures in-
 tended to strengthen the institutional role of business and limit
 direct popular control over local government decisions.
 economic development as one of their three top priorities; 36% said it was their highest
 priority); Robin Paul Malloy, Planning for Serfdom: Legal Economic Discourse and Down-
 town Development (Pennsylvania, 1991) (discussing the legal, political, and economic impli-
 cations of public/private cooperation and urban development and revitalization).
 178 See, for example, Dennis R. Judd, Electoral Coalitions, Minority Mayors, and the
 Contradictions in the Municipal Policy Agenda, in Mark Gottdiener, ed, Cities in Stress: A
 New Look at the Urban Crisis 145, 145 (1986) ("Entrepreneurial strategies constitute the
 heart of the municipal policy agenda of the 1980s.").
 179 Malloy, Planning for Serfdom at 10 (cited in note 177).
 180 See, for example, 1989 NY Sess Laws ch 282 (McKinney, 1989) (authorizing the
 creation of business improvement districts).
 181 See, for example, Clarence N. Stone, Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988
 148 (Kansas, 1989); Adams, Philadelphia at 42 (cited in note 173).
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 III. THE CONTINUING ROLE OF THE STATE INSTRUMENTALITY
 MODEL
 The proprietary cases indicate, in part, the persistence of the
 traditional view of local government as an arm of the state, carry-
 ing out state policies locally. Nor are the special districts the only
 instance of the continuing power of the state instrumentality
 model. Even where general purpose local governments are in-
 volved, the Supreme Court has on occasion deferred to state deci-
 sions concerning the local franchise. This is most apparent in the
 Court's decisions sustaining the power of states to give local gov-
 ernments extraterritorial authority and to determine the extent of
 electoral participation in decisions concerning local boundary
 change. Deference to state authority to shape the representational
 structure of general purpose local governments is also reflected in a
 number of lower court cases upholding state statutes that extend
 the vote to people with a relatively small stake in local elections. In
 each of these situations, although the state statute raised a ques-
 tion concerning discrimination in the availability of the local vote
 or the dilution of the local franchise though the unequal weighting
 of different groups participating in local decisions, the courts used
 tests less exacting than strict scrutiny, thereby giving states a mea-
 sure of discretion in designing local governance.
 A. Extraterritoriality
 Many states grant some municipalities powers to provide pub-
 lic services and regulate conduct outside municipal boundaries.182
 One commentator has observed that "[i]ncreasingly, as one of the
 efforts to cope with metropolitan problems, local governments are
 being given express grants of extraterritorial police powers."'183
 These municipal extraterritorial powers may include zoning, prohi-
 bition of nuisances, licensing and regulation of business, criminal
 law enforcement, and general health and safety regulation.184 Ex-
 traterritorial powers may advance the interests of the municipality
 by allowing it to regulate activities just beyond its borders that
 may have direct effects on the health, safety, or development of
 the municipality. Extraterritoriality may reflect state policies
 182 See generally Frank S. Sengstock, Extraterritorial Powers in the Metropolitan Area
 (Michigan Law School, 1962); Antieau, 1 Municipal Corporation Law ? 5.12 (cited in note
 167).
 183 Antieau, 1 Municipal Corporation Law ? 5.12 at 5-37 (cited in note 167).
 184 Sengstock, Extraterritorial Powers at 52-54 (cited in note 182); Antieau, Municipal
 Corporation Law ? 5.12 (cited in note 167).
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 designed to facilitate central city expansion and limit the forma-
 tion of new municipalities on the urban fringe by strengthening the
 power of the core city over fringe development and reducing the
 incentive of fringe areas to incorporate in order to receive urban
 services. Finally, extraterritoriality may be a way of providing nec-
 essary regulation and services to fringe areas without the popula-
 tion or resources to support their own municipal government.
 From any of these perspectives, extraterritorial authority re-
 flects the state's use of local government to accomplish its own
 ends. Moreover, extraterritoriality separates local government
 power from local representation. The municipality has direct gov-
 ernmental authority over nonresidents, and the fringe area resi-
 dents, in turn, are subject to regulation by a government they do
 not elect. If the government of the municipality is locally elected,
 denying the franchise to fringe area residents subject to extraterri-
 torial authority presents a serious voting rights problem.
 Holt Civic Club v City of Tuscaloosa'85 involved an Alabama
 law giving the City of Tuscaloosa "police jurisdiction" over a three-
 mile radius outside the city limits without providing a concomitant
 extension of the franchise in Tuscaloosa elections to police juris-
 diction residents."8" Citing Kramer, the police jurisdiction resi-
 dents contended that their exclusion from the Tuscaloosa franchise
 had to be subject to strict scrutiny.
 The Supreme Court, however, sustained municipal extraterri-
 torial authority without the extension of the franchise by sidestep-
 ping the implications for fringe area voting rights. The Court noted
 that judicial protection of the right to vote applies only to denials
 of "the franchise to individuals who were physically resident
 within the geographic boundaries of the governmental units con-
 cerned."1187 Even under the democratic model of local self-govern-
 ment, a local government is territorially based and as such "may
 legitimately restrict the right to participate in its political
 processes to those who reside within its borders."'88 The police ju-
 risdiction residents were, of course, not residents of Tuscaloosa.
 That Tuscaloosa's actions affected police jurisdiction residents did
 not bolster their claim to a vote in Tuscaloosa elections because
 185 439 US 60 (1978).
 "I" Id at 61. Tuscaloosa's extraterritorial authority included the power to enforce its
 municipal police and sanitary ordinances; license business, trades, and professions; and col-
 lect license fees equal to one-half that chargeable to similar businesses within the city's
 corporate limits. Id at 61-62.
 187 Id at 68.
 "I Id at 68-69.
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 "[a] city's decisions inescapably affect individuals living immedi-
 ately outside its borders," yet "no one would suggest that nonresi-
 dents likely to be affected by" municipal action "have a constitu-
 tional right to participate in the political processes bringing it
 about."'89 Kramer's principle that the disenfranchisement of any
 elector interested in or affected by a general purpose local govern-
 ment's action triggers strict scrutiny only applies within that gov-
 ernment's borders.
 In effect, the Court denied that Holt was a local voting rights
 case at all and, accordingly, looked only to see if extraterritoriality
 would satisfy the rational basis test. Noting that extraterritorial
 arrangements are longstanding and widespread, the Court found
 that states could reasonably determine that extraterritoriality sat-
 isfies the state's interest in providing "basic municipal services
 such as police, fire, and health protection"'190 on the urban fringe.
 Although the state could have used other local government ar-
 rangements to serve the urban fringe-such as formation of a
 fringe area government or administration by the county-the
 Court relied on Hunter v City of Pittsburgh to confirm that "the
 extraordinarily wide latitude that States have in creating various
 types of political subdivisions and conferring authority upon
 them"'9' encompasses extraterritoriality.192
 Holt reflects the continuing power of the state instrumentality
 model. To be sure, the Court's reliance on formal political bounda-
 ries in marking the contours of the local vote is unexceptionable.
 Any requirement of enfranchising all persons, including nonresi-
 dents, interested in or affected by a local government election
 would leave the size of local electorates indeterminate and poten-
 189 Id at 69.
 190 Id at 74.
 191 Id at 71, citing Hunter, 207 US at 178.
 192 The Court cautioned that a different result might obtain if "a city has annexed out-
 lying territory in all but name, and is exercising precisely the same governmental powers
 over residents of surrounding unincorporated territory as it does over those residing within
 its corporate limits." Id at 73 n 8, citing Little Thunder v South Dakota, 518 F2d 1253 (8th
 Cir 1975). In Little Thunder, the Court of Appeals applied strict scrutiny to invalidate the
 South Dakota statutes, which provided that officials of designated "organized counties"
 would function as the government for "unorganized counties" that consist mostly of reserva-
 tion Indians, with only voters in the organized counties voting for the county officials. The
 court determined that "the officials of the organized county exercise substantial power over
 the affairs of individuals living in the unorganized counties." Little Thunder, 518 F2d at
 1258. By contrast, Tuscaloosa lacked "the vital and traditional authorities of cities and
 towns to levy ad valorem taxes, invoke the power of eminent domain, and zone property for
 various types of uses," in the police jurisdiction, and, thus, extraterritorial regulation was
 not tantamount to annexation. Holt, 439 US at 73 n 8.
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 tially variable from issue to issue and could erode the connection
 between a particular community and its representatives.'93 Resi-
 dency, or some other objective indicator of presence within the lo-
 cality, as a prerequisite to the franchise may be "necessary to pre-
 serve the basic conception of a political community."'94 But there
 were two formal state-created political boundaries in Holt-the
 corporate limits of the City of Tuscaloosa and the extraterritorial
 zone. The people in the police jurisdiction were not simply neigh-
 bors of Tuscaloosa indirectly affected by the city's decisions but
 were, rather, residents of a defined territorial unit subject to a de-
 gree of direct city control. As a matter of voting rights jurispru-
 dence, the Court would have had to determine which was the rele-
 vant political boundary for assessing discrimination in the
 availability of the franchise, the Tuscaloosa city limits or the outer
 perimeter of the extraterritorial zone, and, if the latter, consider
 whether a compelling state interest justified the limitation on the
 franchise to those within the city. Instead, the Court ignored the
 presence of two boundaries, and of two possible definitions of resi-
 dents of Tuscaloosa. It was, thus, able to assume that extraterrito-
 rial authority without a concomitant extension of the franchise
 posed no local voting rights question.
 By severing the voting rights issue from the extraterritorial
 authority question, the Court avoided the issue of representation
 raised by extraterritorial regulation. This issue runs through many
 of the local government voting rights cases: whether a state can
 determine that a local government has a differential impact on dif-
 ferent groups within the government's territorial jurisdiction and
 so structure representation on the local governing body to give a
 greater, or exclusive, voice to the group the state determines is pri-
 marily affected. The local democracy cases require a very tight
 nexus between the franchise and interest in the local government
 and assume that a local government's impact is pervasive within
 its territory even if it primarily serves a particular constituency or
 receives its locally-raised revenues from a specific group. As a re-
 sult, no limitation on the franchise or overrepresentation of a
 193 Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan Governance: The
 Secession of Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local Self-Determination,
 92 Colum L Rev 775, 793 (1992).
 194 Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330, 343-44 (1972).
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 group favored by the state has been sustained for general purpose
 governments.195
 Holt would have been a close case if the outer perimeter of the
 police jurisdiction had been treated as the relevant local boundary
 and strict scrutiny had then been applied to the disenfranchise-
 ment of the police zone residents. The City of Tuscaloosa certainly
 had less power over the urban fringe than it did over residents
 within the corporate limits. The city could not levy ad valorem
 taxes, exercise eminent domain, or zone in the extraterritorial
 belt.'96 On the other hand, the city could enforce municipal police,
 sanitary, and business licensing requirements in the zone and col-
 lect license fees.'97 Residents of the police zone could have plausi-
 bly contended that they were at least as affected by Tuscaloosa as
 the nonparents and nontaxpayers were affected by the operations
 of the school district in Kramer. Applying the Kramer standard
 would have entailed a close consideration of the relationships of
 formal jurisdictional authority, differences in government impact
 within a jurisdiction, and the right to vote in local elections, with
 the burden on the state to justify the exclusion of fringe area resi-
 dents from the municipal vote.'98 The Court, however, dismissed
 the voting rights problem rather than resolve it. Moreover, the
 constitutionality of extraterritoriality was determined by an invo-
 cation of the state instrumentality model of local government. Fed-
 eral constitutional protection of the franchise would not require
 the elimination of a longstanding and widespread mechanism of
 local governance. The selection of the means of providing services
 and regulation in the urban fringe-municipal annexation, fringe
 incorporation, special district, county government, or municipal ex-
 traterritorial police jurisdiction-was a matter for the state. The
 dilemma from a voting rights perspective, that some qualified elec-
 tors could vote for the governing body of a local government and
 other qualified electors also subject to direct regulation by that lo-
 cal government could not, was simply ignored.
 195 In the proprietary cases, the special limited purpose of the districts, the economic
 burdens of the landowner-"investors," and the assumption that those burdens gave the
 landowners a disproportionate interest in the special district, permitted the finding of the
 necessary franchise-interest nexus. Because extraterritoriality involves general purpose gov-
 ernments, the proprietary model is unavailable.
 19e Holt, 439 US at 73 n 8.
 197 Id at 61-62.
 198 See, for example, Note, Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa Extraterritorials De-
 nied the Right to Vote, 68 Cal L Rev 126, 146-49 (1980) (discussing partial enfranchisement
 of fringe area residents).
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 B. Boundary Change"'9
 Boundary change is a widespread phenomenon at the local
 level. Every year thousands of municipalities annex territory, hun-
 dreds of municipalities detach territory, dozens of new municipali-
 ties are incorporated, and a handful of municipalities are merged,
 consolidated, or disincorporated.200 The processes of boundary
 change have implications for local government voting rights. Do lo-
 cal residents have a right to vote on local boundary changes? If the
 residents of one jurisdiction affected by a boundary change are en-
 franchised but residents of other jurisdictions directly affected by
 the same change are not-such as when residents of an area to be
 annexed may vote on the annexation but residents of the annexing
 city may not-does the discrimination in the availability of the
 franchise require a compelling state interest? If the residents of
 different jurisdictions affected by the same boundary change are
 all enfranchised, does federal constitutional protection of the vote
 require a single aggregate majority of all voters, or concurrent ma-
 jorities of voters within each jurisdiction?
 The Supreme Court has directly addressed only the last of
 these issues, but the Court's resolution of that question and its ap-
 proach to extraterritoriality suggest that as a general rule voting on
 boundary changes is largely a matter for state determination. In
 Town of Lockport v Citizens for Community Action,201 the Court
 considered a provision of the New York Constitution that enables
 a county to switch from a weak county to a strong county format,
 with a new administrative structure and enhanced regulatory ca-
 pacity. Such a change requires the approval in a referendum of
 concurrent majorities of voters who live in cities and of those who
 live outside cities. A proposed charter change for Niagara County
 twice won approval of city voters and of a majority of all county
 voters, but each time was rejected by a majority of non-city voters
 and thus failed. City voters contended that the concurrent major-
 ity rule unconstitutionally diluted their votes, but a unanimous Su-
 preme Court disagreed.
 Lockport likened the county reorganization, which strength-
 ened the county government and weakened other local units, to
 199 This section builds on my previous discussion of some aspects of the right to vote on
 local government boundary changes in Briffault, 92 Colum L Rev at 791-805 (cited in note
 193).
 200 See Joel C. Miller, Municipal Annexation and Boundary Change, in International
 City Management Association, Municipal Year Book 1988 59, 64 (ICMA, 1988) (table 1/3).
 201 430 US 259, 260-61 (1977).
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 "the structural decision to annex or consolidate."202 A decision to
 adopt the "strong county" form, like an annexation or a consolida-
 tion, could have a differential impact on the "separate and poten-
 tially opposing interests" of city and noncity voters.203 The Court
 assumed that in an annexation or consolidation proceeding a state
 could require separate consents from the voters of each unit af-
 fected by the boundary change. The electorate of each unit could
 be given veto power over the annexation or consolidation, even
 though the negative vote of a small unit could outweigh the- affirm-
 ative vote of a larger one or of the two units considered together.204
 By analogy, New York could require the concurrent approval of
 the charter change by different groups of county voters.205
 Lockport's indication that a state could require separate con-
 sents of the constituent units in an annexation or consolidation is
 dictum, but the sense is clear. The Court did not explicitly con-
 sider voting rights in boundary change cases, but emphasized the
 "wide discretion the States have in forming and allocating govern-
 mental tasks to local subdivisions"206 and indicated that it would
 defer to a state's determination "that the residents of the annexing
 city and the residents of the area to be annexed formed sufficiently
 different constituencies with sufficiently different interests."207
 Votes could be tabulated on a separate constituency basis, rather
 than across constituency borders. Lockport, however, does not
 mandate, as a matter of constitutional protection of the local
 franchise, a concurrent majority rule. Lockport cited Hunter v City
 of Pittsburgh, which had sustained a state consolidation law that
 provided for a single majority of the aggregate of the voters of the
 two cities proposed for consolidation, over the protest of the voters
 of the smaller city that they were being swallowed up without their
 consent.208 Lockport and Hunter taken together indicate that the
 issue is not one of voting rights but of plenary state authority to
 202 Id at 271.
 203 Id.
 204 Id at 271-73.
 205 Lockport cannot be read simply as authorizing a supermajority requirement for a
 decision that has extraordinary significance for a polity. The Court had previously sustained
 supermajority requirements, but only on condition that the supermajority rule not privilege
 a particular group because of "group characteristics" such as "geographic location." Gordon
 v Lance, 403 US 1, 4 (1971) (sustaining 60% voter approval requirement as precondition for
 issuance of bonded indebtedness). The concurrent majority requirement in Lockport, how-
 ever, turned on geographic location.
 206 Lockport, 430 US at 269.
 207 Id at 271.
 208 Id at 271, citing Hunter, 207 US at 174-79.
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 require separate consents of different territorial constituencies or
 to aggregate all the voters into one constituency.209
 Lockport and Holt, and the invocation of Hunter in both
 cases, also suggest the resolution of the other boundary change vot-
 ing rights issues. As Holt indicated, constitutional interest attaches
 when the state gives the vote to some local residents but not
 others. Combined with Hunter's determination that the states
 have "absolute discretion" to "expand or contract the territorial
 area [of a city], unite the whole or a part of it with another munici-
 pality . . . . with or without the consent of the citizens, or even
 against their protest,"'210 it is apparent that local residents have no
 federal constitutional right to have a local boundary change put to
 a popular vote.211 Further, although discrimination in voting rights
 will be subject to strict scrutiny once the franchise is provided,
 strict scrutiny stops at the local jurisdictional boundary line, and,
 as Lockport and Holt indicate, the states will have considerable
 discretion in selecting the determinative boundary line.212 When
 the residents of one jurisdiction are entitled to vote on a boundary
 change, but the residents of other jurisdictions affected are not,
 strict scrutiny will not apply to this interjurisdictional discrimina-
 tion.213 The issue will be treated not as a matter of voting rights
 but as a question of state boundary change policy.21" Therefore,
 209 See, for example, City of Humble v Metropolitan Transit Authority, 636 SW2d 484
 (Tex App 1982) (sustaining scheme for referendum on creation of a metropolitan transit
 authority that required the separate consents of some incorporated cities, while combining
 other cities into a single election unit).
 210 207 US at 178-79.
 211 See, for example, Carlyn v City of Akron, 726 F2d 287, 290 (6th Cir 1984) (no right
 to vote concerning detachment of territory from one jurisdiction and annexation to an-
 other); Berry v Bourne, 588 F2d 422, 424 (4th Cir 1978) (no right to vote on annexation).
 212 As previously noted, there were two relevant boundary lines in Holt: the city limits
 of Tuscaloosa and the outer perimeter of the police jurisdiction. The Court deferred to the
 state of Alabama's determination that the city limits were the border for the provision of
 the franchise in Tuscaloosa elections. Similarly, there were two relevant boundary lines in
 Lockport: the distinction between the city and noncity portions of Niagara County, and the
 borders of the County itself. Although the Court treated the reorganization of the county
 government as if it were a boundary change, Niagara County had been united as a single
 county unit since the beginning of the nineteenth century. A comparison with Avery, 390
 US 474, is instructive, because in that case the Court declined the invitation to consider
 Midland County as composed of two distinctive units-the city and rural areas-and in-
 stead insisted upon treating the County as a single unit.
 213 See, for example, St. Louis County v City of Town and Country, 590 F Supp 731 (E
 D Mo 1984); Moorman v Wood, 504 F Supp 467 (E D Ky 1980); Murphy v Kansas City, 347
 F Supp 837 (W D Mo 1972); Adams v City of Colorado Springs, 308 F Supp 1397 (D Colo
 1970), affd, 399 US 901 (1970).
 214 The state's plenary authority to choose which jurisdictions will be able to vote on a
 boundary change does not extend to discriminations within a general purpose jurisdiction.
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 the states have plenary authority to implement policies that en-
 courage or impede various types of boundary changes by determin-
 ing that the residents of some but not all units affected will get to
 vote on a proposed change, much as the state can decide whether
 to require concurrent majorities or a single majority from the ag-
 gregate local electorate.
 The only difficult question concerns secession or detachment
 of territory. In justifying a state rule that would require separate
 consents of jurisdictions proposed for consolidation or merger,
 Lockport noted that "[t]he fact of impending union alone would
 not so merge them into one community of interest as constitution-
 ally to require that their votes be aggregated."'215 Arguably, in a
 secession or detachment there is at the time of the vote a single
 jurisdiction, and therefore any effort to limit the vote on secession
 to just one group in that community-such as the residents of the
 area seeking secession-should be subject to strict scrutiny. This
 was, for a time, the position of the California Supreme Court.216 In
 a case involving the secession of a school district from a larger uni-
 fied school district, the California court reasoned that because se-
 cession had an impact on the well-being of the district as a whole,
 all voters in the unified school district were entitled to participate
 in the secession vote.217
 There are, however, two problems with special treatment for
 secession referenda. First, it may be difficult to distinguish a seces-
 sion from other forms of boundary change. Due to the overlapping
 of local governments, a municipal incorporation or municipal an-
 nexation of unincorporated territory may have the effect of the de-
 tachment of that territory from the county. Typically, the county's
 powers to collect revenues or regulate land use and development
 will be reduced when unincorporated territory is attached to or be-
 State efforts to restrict the vote on an annexation to landowners or to require the separate
 consent of landowners have been subject to strict scrutiny and invalidated. See, for example,
 Hayward v Edwards, 456 F Supp 1151 (D SC 1977), affd as Hayward v Clay, 573 F2d 187
 (4th Cir 1978) (where annexing and annexed areas voted separately, approval of voters of
 each could be required, but freeholders of annexed area could not be given veto); Mayor and
 Council of City of Dover v Kelley, 327 A2d 748 (Del 1974) (statutory and city charter provi-
 sions providing for weighting votes in annexation according to assessed valuation of real
 estate owned by each eligible voter unconstitutional in the absence of a compelling state
 interest).
 215 Lockport, 430 US at 271.
 216 Fullerton Joint Union High School District v State Board of Education, 32 Cal 3d
 779, 187 Cal Rptr 398, 654 P2d 168 (1982).
 217 654 P2d at 184-85.
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 comes a municipality.218 Conversely, a city may initiate a detach-
 ment to rid itself of unwanted territory, thereby displacing a bur-
 den to the surrounding county,219 or a secession may be just the
 first step in a two-step process of shifting territory from one ex-
 isting municipality to another.220
 Second, from a voting rights perspective a secession is not a
 unique form of boundary change. The claim to the franchise is
 driven by the argument that the disenfranchised group is as inter-
 ested in and affected by the election as those enfranchised. Annex-
 ations and consolidations may have as great an impact on the resi-
 dents of the areas proposed for merger as a secession or
 detachment would on the area that would lose territory. An annex-
 ation or consolidation may result in the loss of local autonomy for
 a smaller area absorbed into a larger one,221 or may impose new
 burdens of service provision or regulation on a jurisdiction re-
 quired to accept new territory.222 To strictly scrutinize a state deci-
 sion limiting the franchise in a secession election on the theory
 that the residents of the jurisdiction seceded from are as affected
 by the outcome of the referendum as those seeking secession im-
 plies the need for the same standard for all other restrictions on
 boundary change voting.223 Alternatively, strict scrutiny limited to
 restrictions on voting in secession referenda would have the curi-
 ous effect of providing municipalities with a measure of constitu-
 218 See, for example, St. Louis County, 590 F Supp at 736-37; Carlyn, 726 F2d at 289;
 Board of Supervisors of Sacramento County v Local Agency Formation Commission of
 Sacramento County, 3 Cal 4th 903, 13 Cal Rptr 2d 245, 838 P2d 1198, 1200 (1992), cert
 denied, 61 USLW 3645 (1993). See also Marcus v Baron, 456 NYS2d 29 (1982) (a village in
 the town of Ramapo, New York, sought to incorporate in order to get out from under the
 town's growth control zoning ordinances; the town stood in a similar relation to the village
 as a county to a municipality); City of Town & Country v St. Louis, 657 SW2d 598, 612 (Mo
 1983) (en banc) (city's annexation of unincorporated area would result in county's loss of
 tax revenues and loss of control and planning of developable land). Note that in these cases,
 despite the shift of certain powers upon incorporation, newly incorporated areas are still
 formally considered within the larger jurisdiction of which they had been a part.
 219 See, for example, Village of Beechwood v Board of Elections of Cuyahoga County,
 148 NE2d 921, 923 (Ohio 1958).
 210 See, for example, Moorman, 504 F Supp at 476-77; West Point Island Civic Ass'n v
 Township Committee of Dover, 255 A2d 237, 239-40 (NJ 1969).
 See, for example, Hunter, 207 US 161.
 211 See, for example, Citizens Against Forced Annexation v Local Agency Formation
 Commission of Los Angeles County, 32 Cal 3d 816, 187 Cal Rptr 423, 654 P2d 193 (1982)
 (residents of City of Rancho Palos Verdes seeking to resist forced annexation of unincorpo-
 rated territory of Eastview).
 113 See id (applying strict scrutiny to an annexation election and sustaining state stat-
 ute limiting the franchise to those in the area proposed for annexation on the theory that
 the state has a compelling interest in promoting annexation).
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 tional protection from the loss of territory but not from the un-
 wanted addition of territory or from merger into another
 municipality.224
 Although Lockport appears to permit a different rule for se-
 cessions, the sense of both Lockport and Holt, and the significance
 of the citation to Hunter225 in both cases, is that the issue of which
 territorial groups are to vote on local boundaries is for the political
 judgment of state legislatures. Indeed, the California Supreme
 Court recently overturned its previous requirement of strict scru-
 tiny of limitations on the franchise in a secession election, conclud-
 ing that the rational basis test applies and that the state's interest
 in the "logical formation and modification of the boundaries of lo-
 cal agencies" would support restriction of the franchise to the resi-
 dents of some but not all of the territory affected by a boundary
 change.226
 The United States Supreme Court's reliance on the traditional
 model of state-local relations to resolve the issues concerning vot-
 ing rights in boundary change decisions may follow from the prob-
 lematic nature of local boundaries. As Avery indicates, the protec-
 tion of the local franchise is built on a notion of local government
 as democratic self-government, but the concept of self-government
 does not dictate who is the "self' that does the governing.227 In-
 deed, Avery relies on the states to create local governments and to
 give them their powers and territory. To apply strict scrutiny to
 the distribution of the vote concerning boundary changes would
 inevitably entail a constitutional review of the states' municipal
 formation and boundary change policies. But there are no gener-
 ally accepted principles for determining whether a particular local
 government ought to exist, what that unit's geographic dimensions
 ought to be, or whether a particular territory ought to be in that or
 another local unit. Thus, deference to the states is consistent with
 both the lack of a constitutional vantage point for examining state
 224 The application of strict scrutiny in secession voting cases would provide the munic-
 ipality with only limited protection because, as noted, there is no constitutional requirement
 that the state hold any election concerning the boundary change or that the state obtain the
 municipality's consent to the secession or detachment. Hunter, 207 US at 179.
 225 Hunter discusses the power of the state with respect to municipalities to "expand or
 contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal
 the charter and destroy the corporation ... with or without the consent of the citizens or
 even against their protest." Id at 178-79.
 226 Board of Supervisors of Sacramento County, 838 P2d at 1211 (quoting Cal Govt
 Code ? 56001).
 227 Briffault, 92 Colum L Rev at 800 (cited in note 193).
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 municipal formation and boundary change policies228 and the
 traditional jurisprudence of federalism that treats local govern-
 ments as state instrumentalities and leaves the creation and struc-
 ture of local governments to the states.
 C. Expanded Electorates
 The continued power of the state instrumentality model is
 also illustrated by cases involving claims that a state improperly
 extended the local franchise to people who are so much less af-
 fected by a local government than other voters that their participa-
 tion unconstitutionally dilutes the votes of those primarily af-
 fected. The assertion of unconstitutional overextension of the
 electorate has arisen in two settings: overlapping jurisdictions229
 and the enfranchisement of nonresident property owners.230 The
 overlapping jurisdiction problem is best exemplified by a series of
 cases concerning city and county boards of education in Alabama
 and North Carolina, where one school system operates in a city
 and a second system operates in the county in which the city is
 located. The city residents are primarily served by the city school
 system, and they are authorized to vote for the city school board.
 In several instances the city residents have been enfranchised in
 county school board elections as well. The non-city residents of the
 county claimed that the city resident voting in the county school
 board elections unconstitutionally dilutes the non-city vote and
 thereby threatens to undermine the non-city residents' ability to
 2118 The constitutional ban on racial discrimination does provide a basis for invalidating
 racially invidious boundary determinations. See, for example, Gomillion v Lightfoot, 364 US
 339 (1960). See also City of Pleasant Grove v United States, 479 US 462 (1987) (applying
 Voting Rights Act of 1965 to boundary change); Perkins v Matthews, 400 US 379 (1971)
 (same).
 229 See, for example, Davis v Linville, 864 F2d 127 (llth Cir 1989); Sutton v Escambia
 County Bd. of Ed., 809 F2d 770 (llth Cir 1987); Hogencamp v Lee County Bd. of Ed., 722
 F2d 720 (llth Cir 1984); Phillips v Andress, 634 F2d 947 (5th Cir 1981); Creel v Freeman,
 531 F2d 286 (5th Cir 1976); Locklear v North Carolina State Bd. of Elections, 514 F2d 1152
 (4th Cir 1975). See also McMichael v County of Napa, 709 F2d 1268 (9th Cir 1983) (chal-
 lenge by resident of unincorporated area to county-wide vote on a slow growth ordinance
 that applied only to the unincorporated area); Collins v Town of Goshen, 635 F2d 954 (2d
 Cir 1980) (challenge by residents of water district to town-wide vote on management of
 water district, including participation by residents not served by the district); Clark v Town
 of Greenburgh, 436 F2d 770 (2d Cir 1971) (challenge to right of residents of incorporated
 area within town to vote in election for town officers when incorporated area had its own
 village government and town primarily served the unincorporated area).
 230 See, for example, Bjornestad, 281 Cal Rptr at 558-65; Brown v Board of Commis-
 sioners of City of Chattanooga, 722 F Supp 380, 397-98 (E D Tenn 1989); Glisson v Mayor
 & Councilmen of Town of Savannah Beach, 346 F2d 135 (5th Cir 1965).
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 govern their own local educational institutions. In the nonresident
 property owner cases, local adult resident citizens were en-
 franchised regardless of whether they owned property, but the
 states also extended the franchise to some nonresidents who owned
 taxable real property within the community.231
 The overinclusion claim presents the issue, latent in Avery
 and Kramer, of whether those primarily interested in a local gov-
 ernment action have a right to reduce or exclude the representa-
 tion of others who may be significantly less interested. In so doing,
 they underscore the uncertain theoretical foundation of the juris-
 prudence of local voting. A consistent theme in the local election
 cases has been the linkage of franchise and impact. The Supreme
 Court's basic premise is that residents of a jurisdiction have an
 equal right to participate in the election of their local government
 so long as they are comparably affected by that government. The
 doctrine breaks down, however, when the local government has dif-
 ferent degrees of impact on different residents. In the local democ-
 racy cases, the Supreme Court presumed that the local government
 had some roughly comparable impact on all residents and there-
 fore mandated the enfranchisement of all otherwise qualified vot-
 ers. In the overlapping school district cases, however, because of
 the existence of two local systems serving different parts of the
 community, there was substantial evidence of a significant differ-
 ence in the impact the county school district had on city and non-
 city residents.
 If the touchstone for representation is some degree of local im-
 pact, and the county school board has some modest impact on city
 residents, then all residents of the county school district have an
 equal claim to the local franchise. But if equality of participatory
 rights is based on equality of impact, then giving an equal
 franchise to those who are less affected by local action, albeit still
 somewhat affected, can be seen as diluting the rights of those
 231 Some of the situations in which nonresident voting has been authorized include: a
 seaside resort town in which residents of the surrounding county who owned second homes
 in the municipality were enfranchised, Glisson v Mayor & Councilmen of Town of Savan-
 nah Beach, 346 F 2d 135 (5th Cir 1965); a special district in which the franchise was granted
 to both residents and nonresident landowners, Bjornestad v Hulse, 229 Cal App 3d 1568,
 281 Cal Rptr 548 (1991); a Tennessee statute that authorized landowner voting in addition
 to resident voting in a city that so provided, Brown v Board of Commissioners of Chatta-
 nooga, 722 F Supp 380, 397 (E D Tenn 1989); and a provision of the New Mexico constitu-
 tion that extends the vote in municipal bond referenda to any person who owns and pays
 taxes on property within the municipality and who is otherwise qualified to vote in the
 county in which the municipality is situated, Snead v City of Albuquerque, 663 F Supp
 1084 (D NM 1987).
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 much more affected. Moreover, if all voting rules within general
 purpose local governments are subject to strict scrutiny and the
 state is required to provide a compelling state interest for all devi-
 ations from the tight fit of franchise and impact, then the state
 may be unable to justify either the disenfranchisement or the
 equal representation of the less affected residents.
 The courts that considered the overlapping school districts re-
 solved this dilemma by, for the most part,232 exempting the en-
 franchisement of the less affected residents from strict scrutiny.
 But, while professing to apply a rational basis test and to place the
 burden on the non-city residents to demonstrate the irrationality
 of the state's enfranchisement of the less affected city residents in
 elections for the county-wide school board,233 these courts in prac-
 tice also required the states to prove that the overlying jurisdiction
 has some impact on the residents of the underlying included juris-
 diction. This requirement of some objective interest of city resi-
 dents in the operation of county schools has been satisfied when
 the city contributes to the financing of county schools, there are
 student cross-overs between the two systems, or the two systems
 share some facilities.234 As a result, many but not all extensions of
 the franchise in county school board elections to city residents
 have been sustained. The overlapping school district disputes have
 generated an unusual series of local voting cases in which both the
 state's interest in structuring local governments and the primary
 local constituency's interest in avoiding dilution have been weighed
 and the disputes have been resolved through a fact-sensitive con-
 sideration of the extent of city involvement in county schools.
 In the overlapping jurisdiction cases, the city residents were
 also residents of the county and, as a result, would have had at
 least a prima facie case to challenge their exclusion from county
 school board elections. In the nonresident property owner cases,
 the challenged voters would have had no constitutional entitlement
 to vote where they did not reside.23" Thus, the need to avoid strict
 scrutiny, lest neither the expanded nor the narrower definitions of
 the electorate satisfy a compelling state interest, was absent. None-
 "Z Locklear, which applied strict scrutiny, is the exception. 514 F2d at 1154.
 233 See, for example, Sutton, 809 F2d at 772; Creel, 531 F2d at 288.
 234 The judges that have heard these cases have disagreed over how much of a financial
 contribution or how large a cross-over is required to give city residents a significant enough
 interest in the county school system to justify their enfranchisement. Sutton, 809 F2d at
 773-74; Hogencamp, 722 F2d at 722.
 2Sb Instances of nonresident landowner voting that resulted in litigation are described in
 note 231.
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 18:56:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 19931 One Person/One Vote 399
 theless, in these cases, too, the courts declined to subject the ex-
 panded franchise to strict scrutiny, applied a nominal rational ba-
 sis test, and looked for some objective indicia of the added voter's
 interest in the operations of the local government. Generally, the
 courts found that a state could reasonably conclude that property
 owners have "an interest in the operation" of the local govern-
 ment.236 But not all such enfranchisements have been approved.
 Unlike residents, who are either in a jurisdiction or not, nonresi-
 dents can have fractional interests or tiny holdings of municipal
 land. Thus, in one case, the court held that residents could have
 their vote unconstitutionally diluted by the enfranchisement of
 nonresidents who own "trivial" amounts of property within the lo-
 cal jurisdiction.237
 The expanded electorate cases may be explained in terms of a
 bias in favor of the expansion of the franchise,238 but this fails to
 give adequate recognition to the vote dilution claim. The en-
 franchisement of those without some stake in the community
 would reduce the voice of community members in their own local
 affairs, interfere with their efforts to assure that their local govern-
 ment is responsive and accountable to their interests, and, ulti-
 mately, erode their ability to govern themselves. If democratic
 norms apply, the franchise can be extended only to those with
 some recognized stake in the community.239
 230 Glisson, 346 F2d at 137. See also, Brown, 722 F Supp at 399 ("There is no question
 that city property owners, including nonresident property owners, have an interest in the
 conduct of municipal affairs, including property taxes, zoning, public services such as sewage
 and garbage disposal, and other matters that may affect their property.").
 237 Brown, 722 F Supp at 399. In Brown the court noted that "as many as 23 nonresi-
 dents have been registered to vote on a single piece of property in the city," and that in one
 instance fifteen nonresidents were registered as co-owners of a parcel of property assessed at
 $100. Id. As a result, it found that the nonresident landowner enfranchisement provision of
 the Chattanooga city charter did not further any rational government interest and, there-
 fore, fell afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. The court indicated that a property owner
 franchise with a minimum property value provision and a limit on the number of people
 who could vote from a parcel would have been sustained. Id.
 238 Id at 398 ("Over inclusiveness is a lesser constitutional evil than under inclusive-
 ness."), citing Sutton, 809 F2d at 775.
 239 In reviewing these and other cases concerning expanded electorates, my colleague
 Gerald Neuman found a rejection of the notion that the constitution provides a "single
 conception of a political community that uniquely determines the electorate of each govern-
 mental unit." Gerald L. Neuman, "We Are The People": Alien Suffrage in German and
 American Perspective, 13 Mich J Intl L 259, 320. Rather, once the "core electorate" com-
 posed of "a constitutionally privileged category of citizens" (adult, resident, nonfelonious
 citizens) has been enfranchised, id at 313, "government [has] some discretion to supplement
 [it] . . . with a variety of noninvidiously defined optional electorates, consisting of categories
 of persons who have interests implicated in the community's political process," id at 320.
 My reading of these cases is fairly close to his, with two slight differences. First, I think I
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 The question, then, is who decides who has the necessary in-
 terest to support an extension of the franchise? The expanded
 electorate cases indicate that the states will be given considerable
 discretion to extend the franchise to groups affected by a local gov-
 ernment but not constitutionally entitled to vote in local elections.
 Such state decisions will be subject, however, to judicial review to
 protect the interest in local self-government of those residents
 most affected by the dilution that would result from the en-
 franchisement of those with a much smaller local stake. The prin-
 cipal instances of the expanded electorates grow out of two distinc-
 tive features of American local government: the states' practice of
 creating multiple local governments with overlapping powers over
 the same territory, and the historic close connection between local
 government and property ownership.
 With overlapping governments, one local government may
 have a differential impact on different groups of residents within
 its own jurisdictional borders depending on the jurisdiction and
 authority of other local governments. Requiring a tight fit between
 voting rights and local government impact would impose on local
 government a model of jurisdictional separation and electoral dis-
 tinctiveness that is simply not consistent with current local govern-
 ment arrangements. The overlapping government cases may be
 seen as an adaptation of the model of local democracy to the messy
 reality of multiple local governments as well as to the traditional
 role of the states in structuring these governments.
 The nonresident property owner cases are more troublesome,
 with their hint of the proprietary model and their evident ancestry
 in the preferred position of property in determining political
 may be taking the "dilution" claim of the core electorate more seriously. There has to be
 some limit on the state's ability to expand the local electorate lest the opportunity for local
 self-government be denied to those who are most affected by local operations and who are
 likely to lack an alternative jurisdiction to receive services or govern themselves. A similar
 concern may explain the courts' willingness to put some bite into their rational basis review.
 Second, I see these cases as particularly embedded in the history and jurisdictional context
 of American local governments. The longstanding state practice of providing for local fi-
 nance through the property tax provides some justification for the extension of the franchise
 to property owners. Similarly, the state practice of creating overlapping local units without a
 sharp separation of powers or functions or a clear congruence of jurisdiction and impact
 permits the extension of the franchise to those only modestly affected by a government with
 technical jurisdiction over them. History and jurisdictional structure may provide some
 guidance in determining when extending the franchise does not improperly dilute the "core
 electorate's" interest in local self-government-although this is certainly not to reject the
 enfranchisement of new "optional" electorates with a stake in local government activities.
 See id at 322-30 (considering the enfranchisement of resident aliens in state and local
 elections).
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 rights.240 Nevertheless, given the current constitutional protection
 of the franchise for residents without property, the extended
 franchise may be a permissible recognition of the extent to which
 the owners of property in a jurisdiction bear much of the economic
 burdens of local government and, thus, have a cognizable stake in
 the local political process.
 IV. THE MISSING MODEL OF FEDERATIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
 The one person/one vote doctrine requires that representation
 in governing bodies be based on population rather than on the po-
 litical subdivisions of the government in question. Accommodating
 state and local district lines to subdivision boundaries can justify
 relatively minor deviations from population equality,24" but the
 one person/one vote principle effectively dominates the representa-
 tion of political subdivisions in state and local governing bodies.
 The priority of population equality over the representation of
 political subunits was dramatically confirmed by the recent deci-
 sion in Board of Estimate of New York City v Morris,242 in which
 the Supreme Court unanimously invalidated the one borough/one
 vote rule of New York City's Board of Estimate. For most of the
 city's twentieth-century history, the Board wielded broad authority
 over land use and zoning, the disposition of city-owned property,
 240 See, for example, Snead, 663 F Supp at 1085 (tracing the enfranchisement of
 nonresident taxpayers in municipal bond referenda to earlier state constitutional provisions
 that limited the right to vote to taxpayers). As my colleague Gerald Neuman has put it, the
 enfranchisement of both residents, regardless of whether they own property, and nonresi-
 dent property owners reflects "a melding of an earlier republican system in which tradi-
 tional property qualifications defined the core electorate with the class-egalitarian concep-
 tion of democracy" embodied in the rejection of property ownership as a qualification for
 resident voting in Kramer and Cipriano. Neuman, 13 Mich J Intl L at 317 (cited in note
 239).
 Nonresident landowner voting may also be racially discriminatory. Fern Shen, Mary-
 land Town Defends Another Era's Idea of Voting Rights, Washington Post Al (Mar 29,
 1993) (51% of residents of town of Princess Anne are black; nonresident property owners
 "who are primarily white" account for 11% of the town's registered voters). The general
 constitutional considerations that support state discretion to extend the franchise to nonres-
 idents with a considerable property-based stake in the community might not be sufficient to
 preserve such an arrangement if the enfranchisement of property owners is racially discrimi-
 natory in violation of the Voting Rights Act.
 241 See, for example, Abate v Mundt, 403 US 182 (total deviation from population
 equality of 11.9% constitutionally acceptable for county legislature in order to permit legis-
 lative district lines to correspond to the boundaries of towns within the county); Mahan v
 Howell, 410 US 315 (1973) (total deviation from population equality of 16.4% in reappor-
 tionment of Virginia House of Delegates justified by the plan's advancement of state policy
 of respecting the boundaries of political subdivisions).
 242 489 US 688 (1989).
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 and city contracts and franchises, while sharing power with the
 City Council over the budget. The Board consisted of eight mem-
 bers: three officials elected on a city-wide basis, who cast two votes
 apiece, and New York City's five Borough Presidents, who each
 cast one vote.243 Given the wide disparity in population among the
 five boroughs-with the largest borough having more than six
 times the population of the smallest-the Board was an inviting
 target for a one person/one vote challenge.244 New York City
 presented a long list of arguments to justify borough-based repre-
 sentation on the Board, notwithstanding the considerable devia-
 tion from one person/one vote that resulted. Some form of bor-
 ough-based representation had been virtually a constant in the
 governance of the city since the consolidation of New York City
 from the various pre-existing cities and unincorporated areas
 around New York harbor in the late nineteenth century; borough
 borders reflected natural topographical boundaries245 and historic
 political subdivision lines,246 and were not the product of gerry-
 mandering or manipulation; borough identity gave city residents a
 sense of community hard to attain in a large metropolis, and bor-
 ough equality on the Board contributed to the sense of borough
 identity; and in a city of New York's size borough-based voting
 provided desirable representation of subcity interests.247
 There was certainly little evidence that equal representation
 of the boroughs on the Board did much harm to the interests of
 the residents of the larger boroughs. Unlike the rural-dominated
 county legislature in Avery or the junior college district board in
 Hadley, a majority of the city's population was able to elect a ma-
 jority of the votes on the Board. There was no claim that the
 smaller boroughs dominated the City, received more than their fair
 243 Id at 694.
 244 Earlier efforts failed when the New York Court of Appeals found that the Board
 lacked general legislative authority, Bergerman v Lindsay, 25 NY2d 405, 306 NYS2d 898,
 255 NE2d 142, 146 (1969), and a federal district court ruled that the Board was not an
 elective body but rather that its members were elected to other posts and served on the
 Board ex officio. Morris v Board of Estimate, 551 F Supp 652, 656 (E D NY 1982). The
 Supreme Court, however, concluded that the Board was elective because all eight officials
 became members automatically upon their elections to their other offices, and that consis-
 tent with Hadley the Board's powers were "'general enough and have sufficient impact
 throughout'" the City to require compliance with one person/one vote. Morris, 489 US at
 694-96, quoting Hadley, 397 US at 54.
 245 All but one of the borough borders is either a body of water or one of New York
 City's external boundaries.
 248 Each New York City borough corresponds to a county of New York State.
 247 See Morris v Board of Estimate of New York City, 647 F Supp 1463, 1467-75 (E D
 NY 1986).
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 share of benefits, or bore less than their fair share of costs. If there
 was ever a case for tempering the principle of population equality
 with a sensitivity to local conditions and a willingness to allow a
 locality to provide a minority with the greater representation it
 may need to have its interests heard without seriously interfering
 with majoritarian control, the Board of Estimate was the case. The
 Supreme Court, however, rejected all considerations deriving from
 the size and history of New York City or the political reasonable-
 ness of borough equality, finding that neither the Board's accom-
 modation of "natural and political boundaries as well as local in-
 terests" nor the City's claim that borough representation is
 "essential to the successful government of a regional entity, the
 city of New York" could offset the "substantial departure from the
 one-person, one-vote ideal."248
 The unwillingness to compromise the equal population ideal
 to permit the representation of public subdivisions may have two
 consequences for local governments. First, it may impair the pros-
 pects for decentralization of power within an existing city. Neigh-
 borhoods or communities would have a stronger sense of identity,
 and neighborhood or community governments could be more pow-
 erful, if they were represented directly in city governing bodies.249
 As one commentator has observed, New York City's system of
 community boards with advisory and consultative powers concern-
 ing budgets, land use, and service provision is weakened because
 the boundaries of community districts are not coterminous with
 city council districts. The community boards are, thus, less able
 "to provide a channel through which neighborhood activists make
 their needs known to decision makers."260 With rigid adherence to
 the one person/one vote doctrine, council districts cannot be
 mapped onto community board lines, even though there are nearly
 the same number of council districts and community districts,261
 248 Morris, 489 US at 702-03.
 249 Compare Nancy Maveety, Representation Rights and the Burger Years 42 (Michi-
 gan, 1991) (discussing proposal to make districts in the House of Representatives coincide
 with county or town boundaries within states to preserve representatives' "loyalty to their
 state and its local communities").
 250 Viteritti, The New Charter at 426 (cited in note 14).
 251 There are 51 city council districts and 59 community boards. See Frank J. Mauro,
 Voting Rights and the Board of Estimate: The Emergence of an Issue, in Frank J. Mauro
 and Gerald Benjamin, eds, Restructuring the New York City Government: The
 Reemergence of Municipal Reform 62, 67 (Capital City Press, 1989) (37 Proceedings of the
 Academy of Political Science No.3); Robert F. Pecorella, Community Governance: A Decade
 of Experience, in Mauro and Benjamin, Restructuring the New York City Government 97,
 97; NYC Charter ?? 22, 2702 (1988).
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 because the principle of equal population representation requires
 decennial reapportionment of council districts in light of popula-
 tion changes.252 Council-community coterminality would, therefore,
 force the reshaping of community districts, but community dis-
 tricts are based on traditional neighborhoods or the city's service
 delivery patterns253 that do not ordinarily change with population
 fluctuations. Neighborhood government requires stable borders
 that correspond to residents' understanding of the territorial
 dimensions of their communities. That would be disrupted if com-
 munity districts were made coterminous with city council districts.
 Equal population representation at the city level is thus inconsis-
 tent with council district/community board coterminality, and
 that, in turn, may weaken the effectiveness of those community
 governments.
 Second, equal population representation may impede city-
 county consolidations, regional governments, or similar efforts to
 create governance structures capable of addressing metropolitan
 area-wide problems. This was a central concern of the dissenting
 Supreme Court justices in Avery and Hadley254 and of commenta-
 tors at the time of those two decisions.255 For political reasons, the
 creation of a regional government or the consolidation of a city
 with the surrounding county may require the consent of the af-
 fected units. Residents of smaller units may fear that their voices
 and their interests will be lost in a regional entity unless they are
 given extra representation. Cities with traditions of home rule may
 want additional representation in overlying regional units that may
 limit municipal powers.256 All participants may view the pre-ex-
 isting local government as the primary focus of their interest in
 local government and thus may seek to provide for representation
 of the constituent local units in the regional entity. The inability
 to create a federal structure in which the principle of population
 equality is tempered by a concern for some parity among the pre-
 existing units may render the regional unit politically impossible.
 If, as is typically the case, the regional unit is less than a fully
 consolidated metropolitan government, but simply the top layer of
 252 See NYC Charter ? 2703 (1988).
 253 See, for example, NYC Charter ? 2704 (1988).
 254 Avery, 390 US at 486, 495, 509 (Harlan, Fortas, Stewart dissenting); Hadley, 397 US
 at 59, 70 (Harlan, Fortas, Stewart dissenting).
 255 See, for example, Dixon, 58 Georgetown L J at 971-85 (cited in note 13).
 268 See, for example, Cunningham v Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 751 F Supp
 885 (overrepresentation of City of Seattle and large cities with mayor-council form of gov-
 ernment on the governing council of metropolitan area multi-purpose special district).
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 a two-tier federation or a multi-purpose special district that leaves
 many other local powers in the hands of the pre-existing local gov-
 ernments,2"7 it may, indeed, make more sense to think of the new
 government in federal terms and provide for some representation
 of the local units as local units. In addition, apart from the
 problems posed by the desire to provide extra representation to
 local units or to adhere to some goal of parity for pre-existing gov-
 ernments, the one person/one vote principle may make it difficult
 to use component localities as districts for election to the regional
 body because the local units are likely to have substantially differ-
 ent populations and reliance on political unit boundaries will often
 create substantial deviations from population equality.
 There were so few successful efforts toward elective regional
 government in the decades immediately preceding the application
 of the one person/one vote principle to local governments that it is
 difficult to determine whether the inability to offer subunit-based
 representation with deviations from population equality has con-
 tributed to the lack of movement toward regional government in
 the past quarter-century. The Supreme Court's invalidation of the
 one borough/one vote principle on the New York City Board of
 Estimate and a federal district court's recent invalidation of the
 overrepresentation of Seattle and certain other cities on the gov-
 erning council of the Seattle metropolitan area multi-purpose spe-
 cial district,258 however, confirm the potential for the one person/
 one vote doctrine to disrupt the creation of constituent units-based
 elective regional structures.
 There have been two structural efforts to reconcile the repre-
 sentation of constituent local units in regional governments with
 the strictures of one person/one vote: appointive bodies and
 weighted voting. Both approaches permit the creation of regional
 governments based on subunits, but both also raise questions con-
 cerning the nature of the representation provided.
 A. Appointive Bodies
 The appointive solution is predicated on the exemption of ap-
 pointive bodies from equal population representation. The courts
 have treated the exemption as virtually tautological: The principle
 of equal population representation is based on the constitutional
 2"7 See, for example, Harrigan, Political Change in the Metropolis at 265-69, 311-21
 (cited in note 79).
 258 Cunningham, 751 F Supp 885.
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 requirement of equal protection of voters; equal protection, in
 turn, mandates equally weighted votes for all voters within a juris-
 diction. If an office is not filled by popular vote, then the constitu-
 tional protection of the franchise does not apply,259 and any chal-
 lenge to a state scheme of subunit representation on an appointive
 body would be subject only to a rational basis test and likely sus-
 tained under Hunter's principle of deference to state power to
 structure local relations.260 Although there may be some outer limit
 on the state's power to provide for appointive local governments,261
 the courts have consistently treated appointive bodies with mem-
 bers selected from component units of unequal population as ex-
 empt from the equal population representation principle.262
 Two problems arise with the use of the appointive exemption
 to create federative regional governments. First, as a descriptive
 matter, it may at times be uncertain whether a body ought to be
 treated as elective or appointive. This ambiguity may occur when
 259 See, for example, Sailors v Board of Education of Kent County, 387 US 105, 110-11
 (1967). Sailors involved the Michigan system for selecting county school boards, which in-
 volved local voters electing local boards, then the local boards sending delegates to a bien-
 nial meeting at which they voted, on a one local school board/one vote basis, for members of
 the county board. The Court exempted the county school board members from the equal
 population representation principle for a combination of reasons-the administrative nature
 of the board, and the lack of a direct popular election for board members. "Since the choice
 of members of the county school board did not involve an election and since none was re-
 quired for these nonlegislative offices, the principle of 'one man, one vote' has no relevancy."
 Id at 111. The Court's subsequent rejection of the constitutional relevance of the adminis-
 trative/legislative distinction in Avery, 390 US at 482-83, and Hadley, 397 US at 55-56,
 suggests that the crucial feature in Sailors was the absence of a direct popular election.
 260 Compare Presley v Etowah County Commission, 112 S Ct 820 (1992) (Voting Rights
 Act's requirement of preclearance of changes affecting voting does not extend to transfer of
 powers from elected officials to appointed official) with Quinn v Millsap, 491 US 95 (1989)
 (finding no rational basis for Missouri requirement that appointees to a board authorized to
 draft a plan of reorganization for the city and county of St. Louis be landowners).
 261 See, for example, Sheldon H. Nahmod, Reflections on Appointive Local Govern-
 ment Bodies and a Right to an Election, 11 Duquesne L Rev 119 (1972). But see Van
 Zanen v Keydel, 280 NW2d 535, 539 (Mich App 1979) (evaluating the powers of the Huron-
 Clinton Metropolitan Authority and finding that state could provide for the appointment of
 the Authority's commissioners).
 262 Compare Burton v Whittier Regional Vocational Technical School District, 587
 F2d 66 (lst Cir 1978) (regional school district board based on modified one municipality/one
 vote system in which city with 41% of population had only 2 of 13 seats sustained because
 board members were appointed by the constituent municipalities) with Kelleher v South-
 eastern Regional Vocational Technical High School District, 806 F2d 9 (lst Cir 1986) (elec-
 tive regional school board in which town with 46% of district's population had only 20% of
 the seats held unconstitutional). See also Oliver v Board of Education of City of New York,
 306 F Supp 1286 (S D NY 1969) (invalidating plan for New York City board of education in
 which five of seven members would be elected from the boroughs on a one borough/one vote
 basis, while sustaining interim plan in which each borough president would appoint one
 borough representative).
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 an important function of locally elected officials is to make ap-
 pointments to the regional body and when the locally elected offi-
 cials themselves may be selected to serve on the regional body.263
 The closer the connection between local election and regional ap-
 pointment, the more the appointments from local units of differing
 populations may be seen as an infringement of the right to an
 equally weighted vote of the residents of the more populous local
 unit.264 On the other hand, some close connection between local
 election and regional appointments may be desirable to promote
 the accountability of the regional officials and to enhance the pub-
 lic's participation in the affairs of the regional government.
 This suggests the second, more normative, problem with ap-
 pointive regional governments-the lack of a direct popular con-
 nection between the government and the region served. The desire
 for some locally elective tie for regional officeholders may explain
 the instances of elected local officials making appointments, or be-
 ing eligible for appointment, to a regional board.265 In general, ap-
 pointive officials will not be directly accountable to the public and
 the public is likely to be less able to participate in the decision-
 making of an appointive body and less aware of its deliberations
 and activities. An appointive body is probably less capable than an
 elected body of building a sense of regional community among area
 residents, of creating a consciousness of the region as an area with
 shared interests and concerns, or of treating a region as a local unit
 appropriate for self-government.266 Moreover, an appointive re-
 gional body may have less power over the component local govern-
 ments than an elective body would. The appointive body would
 263 See, for example, Rosenthal v Board of Education of Central High School District
 No. 3 of Town of Hempstead, 385 F Supp 223 (E D NY 1974) (upholding constitutionality
 of system wherein voters elected members of boards of union free school districts and each
 district board then selected two of its members to sit on the central board).
 284 When New York City revised its charter to replace the Board of Estimate, it re-
 structured its City Planning Commission to assure borough representation by authorizing
 each borough president to make one appointment to the Commission. The charter sought to
 attenuate the connection between the borough-elected presidents and the appointed Com-
 mission members and avoid the charge that the members were mere alter egos of the bor-
 ough presidents by giving the members terms rather than have them serve at the pleasure of
 the borough presidents. NYC Charter ? 192 (1988).
 "I" See, for example, Moore v Wilson, 372 SE2d 357 (SC 1988) (district highway com-
 missioner elected by county legislative delegations); Rosenthal, 385 F Supp at 225; Oliver,
 306 F Supp at 1287.
 268 But see John J. Harrigan and William C. Johnson, Governing the Twin Cities Re-
 gion: The Metropolitan Council in Comparative Perspective 135-37 (Minn 1978) (defending
 the appointive nature of the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council and criticizing proposals to
 make the council elective).
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 lack the legitimacy that comes from election, and, if the regional
 members are selected by elected local officials, they may have less
 stomach for a political confrontation with those to whom they are
 beholden for their positions. Thus, appointive bodies provide a
 way around the Supreme Court's restriction on the representation
 of localities in federative regional governments, but at the price of
 either weakening the effectiveness and legitimacy of those govern-
 ments or of creating selection mechanisms that try to minimize the
 appointment/election distinction that is the basis for the constitu-
 tional exemption of appointive governments from the equal popu-
 lation representation requirement.
 B. Weighted Voting
 The other governance structure that may be able to reconcile
 equal population representation with the election of representa-
 tives from political subunits is weighted voting. The Supreme
 Court has indicated that the one person/one vote requirement does
 not mandate election districts of equal population but can be satis-
 fied by districts of different population as long as representation is
 proportionate to population.267 There are, however, several argu-
 ments that weighted voting is inconsistent with equal population
 representation.
 On the one hand, weighted voting may underrepresent voters
 in the more populous districts. Legislators do more than cast votes.
 They negotiate legislation, participate in committee activities,
 oversee agencies, and perform constituent service. A legislator from
 a large district may be given proportionately more votes than a
 legislator from a small district, but she cannot engage in propor-
 tionately more activities, devote herself to the negotiation of pro-
 portionately more bills, or be in proportionately more places at the
 same time. Even with weighted voting, constituents in large dis-
 tricts may not obtain representation proportional to their
 numbers.268
 287 See, for example, Abate, 403 US 182; Whitcomb v Chavis, 403 US 124, 141-48
 (1971); Kilgarlin v Hill, 386 US 120 (1967); Burns v Richardson, 384 US 73 (1966); Fortson
 v Dorsey, 379 US 433 (1965).
 268 This problem could be ameliorated by the election at-large of a proportionate num-
 ber of representatives from each local component of a regional jurisdiction. This solution is
 also fraught with difficulty. First, like weighted voting, it raises the prospect of submerging
 the interests of minorites. See text at note 277. Second, it may be difficult to make differ-
 ences in representation as precisely proportionate to differences in population as one per-
 son/one vote requires when representatives are elected at large. With component units of
 varying populations, interdistrict ratios may not be whole integers but, rather, fractions.
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 On the other hand, weighted voting may overrepresent voters
 in the more populous districts. This may occur because a district
 represented by a single legislator entitled to cast a multiple vote
 will have more voting power than a second district represented by
 a number of legislators, each having one vote, who together can
 cast the same number of votes as the representative from the first
 district. The multiple representatives from the second district may
 disagree and cast conflicting votes; but the single legislator with
 multiple votes will cast all her votes in a bloc, thereby assuring the
 first district greater voting power in the legislature than the second
 district with the same number of votes.269 An example of how
 weighted voting based purely on population can overrepresent
 larger political subdivisions may be instructive. In nearly half the
 governing bodies of New York State's counties, the town is the
 unit of election, with town representatives given weighted votes.270
 Nassau County has five towns. Hempstead, the largest town, has
 fifty-seven percent of the county's population. If the Hempstead
 representative were given fifty-seven percent of the total votes,
 then for any matter subject to majority decision the other repre-
 sentatives might as well stay home because fifty-seven percent of
 the votes is equivalent to one hundred percent of the voting
 power.271
 Consider a three-district jurisdiction with population ratios of 2.3 to 1.7 to 1.0. To comply
 with one person/one vote, at-large elections would require either (a) electing some repre-
 sentatives who cast fractional votes (for example, giving the first district two representatives
 who cast 1.15 votes apiece or three who cast 0.77 votes apiece) or (b) moving the decimal
 point and electing a very large number of representatives at-large from each district, (for
 example, 23 from the first district, 17 from the second, and 10 from the third.) The first
 solution, however, recreates the possible under- or over-representation in the nonvoting as-
 pects of representation which is the flaw in weighted voting since the individuals elected
 would, of course, be integers even if they cast fractional votes: If the first district has two
 seats on a five-member body its residents may be underrepresented in nonvoting matters
 but if it has three seats on a six-member body its residents may be overrepresented. The
 second solution would achieve proportionality in both the voting and nonvoting aspects of
 representation, but such a large legislative body may be unwieldy at the local level.
 269 See generally William H. Riker and Lloyd S. Shapley, Weighted Voting: A Mathe-
 matical Analysis for Instrumental Judgments, in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chap-
 man, eds, Nomos X: Representation 199 (Atherton, 1968).
 270 See, for example, League of Women Voters of Nassau County v Nassau County Bd.
 of Supervisors, 737 F2d 155, 166 n 10 (2d Cir 1984) ("Of New York State's 57 counties
 (outside of New York City), 24 employ weighted voting systems."). See generally Ronald E.
 Johnson, An Analysis of Weighted Voting as Used in Reapportionment of County Govern-
 ments in New York State, 34 Albany L Rev 1 (1969).
 271 See, for example, Franklin v Krause, 32 NY2d 234, 344 NYS2d 885, 298 NE2d 68,
 68-69 (1973). See also League of Women Voters, 737 F2d 155. Nassau County dealt with
 this problem by giving Hempstead less than its population-based proportionate share of
 votes on the governing board and by requiring a supermajority for the passage of all legisla-
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 To deal with the bloc consequences of weighted voting, the
 New York State Court of Appeals has required that weighted votes
 be based not on population but on voting power. A legislator's vot-
 ing power has been defined as "the mathematical possibility of his
 casting a decisive vote."272 The Court thus requires a tabulation of
 all the possible voting combinations on a county legislature and
 the percentage of combinations in which any given legislator would
 cast the decisive vote. The percentage of instances in which the
 legislator casts the decisive vote must then be proportional to the
 share of the population that legislator represents.273 This may
 mean that representatives of larger districts get fewer votes than
 population alone might dictate.274
 Adjusting weighted voting to achieve proportional voting
 power has, in turn, been subject to criticism for elevating a mathe-
 matical model over the realities of political life. Voting power mod-
 els assume that all possible voting combinations are equally likely
 to occur. That, of course, ignores the likelihood of other forms of
 bloc voting-based on partisanship, race, issue cleavages, or other
 factors-that may render the calculations of voting power highly
 unrealistic.276 In other words, without some consideration of voting
 tion. Franklin, 298 NE2d at 68-69; League of Women Voters, 737 F2d at 157-58. A federal
 district court has recently invalidated the apportionment of the Nassau County Board of
 Supervisors, noting that because of the supermajority requirement "the residents of Hemp-
 stead will forever be underrepresented on the basis of population in any vote taken." Jack-
 son v Nassau County Board of Supervisors, 818 F Supp 509 (E D NY 1993).
 272 Iannucci v Board of Supervisors of County of Washington, 20 NY2d 244, 282
 NYS2d 502, 229 NE2d 195, 199 (1967). Iannucci builds on John F. Banzhaf III, Weighted
 Voting Doesn't Work: A Mathematical Analysis, 19 Rutgers L Rev 317 (1965).
 273 Iannucci, 229 NE2d at 199. See also Greenwald v Board of Supervisors of Sullivan
 County, 567 F Supp 200, 203 n 15 (S D NY 1983).
 274 To deal with a subunit that has a majority of the population of the entire larger
 community, there may be a need for a supermajority vote to pass legislation. See note 271.
 273 In the Board of Estimate case New York City sought to use the voting power model
 to defend the one borough/one vote rule because, in the City's calculations, the voting power
 model suggested a lower degree of malapportionment than the pure comparison of borough
 votes to population. The Supreme Court, however, treated voting power as "a mathematical
 calculation that itself stops short of examining the actual day-to-day operations of the legis-
 lative body" and was sharply critical of the model's "unrealistic approach." 489 US at 698-
 99. Some commentators have treated Morris's comments as the death knell of voting power
 analysis and, ultimately, of weighted voting. See, for example, Richard David Emery,
 Weighted Voting, 6 Touro L Rev 159 (1989); M. David Gelfand and Terry Allbritton, Con-
 flict and Congruence in One-Person, One-Vote and Racial Vote Dilution Litigation: Issues
 Resolved and Unresolved by Board of Estimate v. Morris, 6 J L & Pol 93, 111-13 (1989).
 The New York courts continue to require that weighted voting plans be subject to a
 voting power analysis and to treat weighted voting as a viable option for county government.
 See Matter of Curcio v Boyle, 147 AD2d 194, 542 NYS2d 1009 (1989). A federal district
 court recently concluded that "a weighted voting plan as it is presently utilized by the Nas-
 sau County Board of Supervisors" violates one person/one vote. Jackson, 818 F Supp at 531.
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 power, weighted voting may overrepresent larger jurisdictions; but
 mathematical analysis alone, without an examination of "the ac-
 tual day-to-day operations of the legislative body,"271 may be una-
 ble to measure voting power.
 Even if weighted voting could properly assure that subunit
 representation is based on population, weighted voting raises the
 prospect of submerging the interests of minorities within a
 weighted voting jurisdiction. This is a concomitant of weighted
 voting's single representative-bloc voting feature. Weighted voting
 not only empowers larger blocs relative to smaller ones, it also
 means that in larger districts one representative will be elected in-
 stead of many. In those jurisdictions, one jurisdiction-wide plural-
 ity will elect the single person who will represent the entire juris-
 diction. As a result, geographically concentrated minorities who
 might have been able to elect representatives from districts within
 the jurisdiction will win none of the jurisdiction's vote when it
 selects one representative on a jurisdiction-wide basis. When the
 representation of racial and language minorities is so diluted,
 weighted voting will be subject to challenge under the Voting
 Rights Act.277
 C. Rethinking One Person/One Vote and Regional Governments
 Appointment is unlikely to secure the accountability and legit-
 imacy desirable for regional bodies, and weighted voting for elected
 representatives may not satisfy the requirements of equal popula-
 tion representation. Should the demands of one person/one vote be
 relaxed to accommodate the representation of subunits in regional
 governments? This requires consideration of the value of regional
 governments and the nature of the one person/one vote doctrine.
 There is certainly considerable theoretical support for the cre-
 ation of regional units to deal with problems of regional scope.
 The court determined that in Morris "the Supreme Court firmly rejected weighted voting,
 not only because of the mathematical quagmire such a system engenders, but just as impor-
 tantly because the methodology fails to take into account other critical factors related to the
 actual daily operations of a governing body." Id. The court's opinion, however, also criti-
 cized the specific allocation of the votes on the Board of Supervisors and indicated that even
 under a weighted voting/voting power analysis "the present configuration of the Board of
 Supervisors violates the one person, one vote principle." Id at *29.
 276 Morris, 489 US at 699.
 277 Concern about the minority dilution features of weighted voting, and the conse-
 quent likelihood of a Voting Rights challenge, led New York City's Charter Revision Com-
 mission to scrap the Board of Estimate outright rather than maintain borough representa-
 tion with weighted votes. See Mauro, Voting Rights and the Board of Estimate (cited in
 note 251).
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 Most metropolitan areas are fragmented into dozens, if not hun-
 dreds, of localities, while many of the problems that local govern-
 ments address transcend today's local boundaries. Regional gov-
 ernments are more likely to have the institutional capacity, public
 resources, and metropolitan perspective to provide those ser-
 vices-such as water supply, sewage disposal, pollution control,
 and transportation-that need to be handled on an area-wide ba-
 sis. Similarly, regional units could engage in the comprehensive
 area-wide planning necessary to permit coordinated regional devel-
 opment, match physical infrastructure to population growth, and
 determine the siting of regionally necessary but locally undesirable
 facilities, as well as the location of amenities likely to be used on a
 regional basis.278 Election of the holders of regional offices could
 enhance their accountability and mitigate the sense of loss of con-
 trol that people might feel if regulatory power and responsibility
 for the provision of services is vested in a unit more distant from
 the local community.
 Although at one time urban reformers pressed for the full con-
 solidation of pre-existing localities into governments of metropoli-
 tan scope, these proposals drew little popular support and, indeed,
 considerable resistance from local residents who feared loss of au-
 tonomy through absorption into a larger unit.279 As a result, advo-
 cates of regional units have generally abandoned the goal of full
 consolidation and have instead developed proposals for "two-tier"
 or "federative" plans that would move certain governmental func-
 tions to the regional level while reserving others to pre-existing lo-
 cal governments.280 Further along the continuum from full consoli-
 dation are multi-purpose regional councils or special districts, like
 278 See, for example, Note, It's Time to Create a Bay Area Regional Government, 42
 Hastings L J 1103 (1991).
 279 Most consolidation proposals require voter approval for adoption, and voters have
 generally been resistant, particularly where there are significant economic or social differ-
 ences among the communities proposed for consolidation. See generally W.E. Lyons, The
 Politics of City-County Merger chs 1-3 (Kentucky, 1977); John E. Filer and Lawrence W.
 Kenny, Voter Reaction to City-County Consolidation Referenda, 23 J L & Econ 179 (1980);
 Vincent L. Marando, City-County Consolidation: Reform, Regionalism, Referenda and Re-
 quiem, 32 W Pol Q 409, 411 (1979).
 280 See Committee for Economic Development, Reshaping Government in Metropoli-
 tan Areas 19-20 (CED, 1970). The "two closest approximations" to the Committee for Eco-
 nomic Development's two-tier model are Miami-Dade County, Florida, which utilizes the
 existing county as the basis for a metropolitan-level government, and Toronto, Canada,
 which is a "true federative government." Harrigan, Political Change in the Metropolis at
 318-21 (cited in note 79).
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 the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council,281 which oversees transit,
 sewers, and regional park development in the Minneapolis-St. Paul
 area, or the Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, which was cre-
 ated to provide sewage disposal and transit services for the Seattle
 metropolitan area.282 The unifying theme in these various struc-
 tures is the shift of responsibility for some services and some regu-
 latory authority to the regional level, while preserving pre-existing,
 smaller local governments and assuring them continuing autonomy
 over a range of other functions.
 The value of regional governance structures is certainly debat-
 able, and many scholars question whether there would be improve-
 ments of service quality or cost. But even those scholars who find
 the interests in efficiency and accountability better served by the
 fragmentation of metropolitan areas into a multiplicity of small
 units have primarily opposed full consolidation, not special dis-
 tricts of regional scope.283 Resistance to regionalization based on
 the view that local governments ought to be scaled to the economic
 and institutional needs of the services provided, and that most ser-
 vices can be effectively provided by relatively small units,284 is con-
 sistent with the creation of multipurpose regional structures for
 water, sanitation, pollution control, transportation, and other
 problems that are best addressed on an area-wide basis.
 Ultimately, the benefits of regional structures cannot be
 proven-at least not with the level of certainty necessary to be a
 compelling state interest-just as it cannot be demonstrated that
 the election of regional officials on a constituent local government
 basis is necessary to the creation of regional structure. The crea-
 tion and design of regional bodies is a political process, based on a
 state's policy preferences and its determination whether effective
 and efficient service delivery and planning are better achieved
 through regional institutions; whether such service delivery and
 281 See generally Harrigan and Johnson, Governing the Twin Cities Region 41 (cited in
 note 266).
 282 See Cunningham, 751 F Supp at 889-90. Currently, most metropolitan multipurpose
 districts are appointive rather than elective bodies. The principal exception was the Munici-
 pality of Metropolitan Seattle, and its representation structure was held to have violated the
 one person/one vote requirement. Id at 893.
 283 See, for example, Vincent Ostrom, Robert Bish, and Elinor Ostrom, Local Govern-
 ment in the United States ch 4 (ICS, 1988); Robert Bish, The Public Economy of Metro-
 politan Areas ch 5 (Markham, 1971).
 284 The assumption is that the population needed for scale economies for most govern-
 ment services ranges from 40,000 to 200,000, or much smaller than most metropolitan re-
 gions. See, for example, Howard W. Hallman, Small and Large Together: Governing the
 Metropolis 192-93 (Sage, 1977).
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 planning ought to accomodate the values of public participation
 and accountability by making regional posts elective; and whether
 the relationship between the regional and local governments would
 be enhanced by basing representation in the regional government
 on pre-existing local units.
 Hadley and Board of Estimate indicate that the policy and
 political concerns that might lead to an elective, federative regional
 government would not be sufficient to overcome the one person/
 one vote requirement as it now stands. But both the uncertain the-
 ory of representation underlying one person/one vote and the un-
 evenness of that doctrine's application to local governments sug-
 gest the possibility of new flexibility when regional local
 governments are at issue. In terms of the theory of representation,
 the issue requires a return to the debate between Chief Justice
 Warren and Justice Stewart at the time the rule of equal popula-
 tion representation was adopted. Chief Justice Warren found that
 the basic premise of representative government is majority rule
 and that majority rule, in turn, mandates the equal weighting of
 votes, otherwise the overrepresentation of some groups might re-
 duce a popular majority into a legislative minority. A clear, quanti-
 tative rule-one person/one vote-was intended to prevent minor-
 ity control.286 Moreover, Chief Justice Warren dismissed the
 significance of all interests other than population in measuring the
 fairness of representation, writing that "[l]egislators represent peo-
 ple, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms
 or cities or economic interests."286
 By contrast, Justice Stewart and the dissenters took a more
 qualitative approach. They looked to the efficacy of different rep-
 resentation schemes under different circumstances, rather than to
 the formal equality of voters. According to Justice Stewart,
 legislators do not represent faceless numbers. They represent
 people, or, more accurately, a majority of the voters in their
 districts-people with identifiable needs and interests which
 require legislative representation, and which can often be re-
 lated to the geographical areas in which these people live. The
 very fact of geographical districting . . . carries with it an ac-
 ceptance of the idea of legislative representation of regional
 needs and interests.287
 286 Reynolds, 377 US at 565-66.
 2881 Id at 562.
 287 Lucas v Forty-fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 US 713, 750 (1964) (Stew-
 art dissenting).
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 Moreover, the numerical equality of voters is not the only factor to
 be considered in reviewing a representation scheme:
 Representative government is a process of accommodating
 group interests ....
 [P]opulation factors must often to some degree be subor-
 dinated in devising a legislative apportionment plan which is
 to achieve the important goal of ensuring a fair, effective, and
 balanced representation of [] regional, social and economic
 interests.288
 The variety of demographic, topographic, historic, economic, and
 social interests in each jurisdiction suggests that a wide variety of
 apportionment schemes be permitted. The only restrictions Justice
 Stewart would have imposed are that a legislative apportionment
 plan must not be irrational and must not "permit the systematic
 frustration of the will of a majority of the electorate."289
 Justice Stewart's position failed in the reapportionment cases.
 Indeed, at a time when the focus of reapportionment litigation was
 on the severely malapportioned, rural-dominated state legislatures,
 his effort to combine some attention to population with group in-
 terests, qualitative factors, and local circumstances, and to require
 courts to undertake a lengthy, multi-factored inquiry into the op-
 erations of the political process in each districting case, could have
 been seen as an apologia for the perpetuation of malapportion-
 ment. The very specific "code"-like quality of one person/one vote
 undoubtedly facilitated the process of uprooting past abuses and
 preventing sharp deviations from population equality in the future
 by giving lower courts and legislatures a relatively determinate
 standard to apply.289 It may have also enhanced the legitimacy of
 judicial intervention in the determination of political structures by
 indicating that questions of representation could be resolved by a
 relatively simple formal rule, rather than a complex analysis of the
 variety of political, economic, social and cultural factors that go
 into a determination of the fundamental fairness of a plan of rep-
 resentation. But the insight in Justice Stewart's analysis has been
 borne out by the Supreme Court's and Congress's subsequent real-
 288 Id at 749, 751.
 289 Id at 753-54.
 289 See, for example, David A. Strauss, The Role of a Bill of Rights, 59 U Chi L Rev
 539, 540-48 (1992) (discussing the use of "a bill of rights ... as a code that facilitates re-
 form-a specific list of requirements or prohibitions to help break up traditional practices
 that are in need of change").
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 ization that numerical equality of voters and majority rule alone do
 not guarantee fair representation. Indeed, one person/one vote is
 quite consistent with districting that "fences out" or "dilutes" the
 representation of minority groups, particularly racial and language
 minorities291 and weaker political parties.292 Population alone is
 not the sole determinant of fair representation; the Constitution
 and the Voting Rights Act also mandate attention to the represen-
 tation of politically salient groups.
 Of course, to say that population equality is not sufficient for
 fair representation does not mean that it is not necessary to the
 definition of fair representation. As Justice Stewart noted, surely
 any constitutional representation scheme must prevent "system-
 atic frustration of the will of a majority."293 Population equality
 and majority rule are essential components of representation, but
 they need not completely displace other factors that have tradi-
 tionally been considered in representation schemes. Indeed, the lo-
 cal government franchise and representation cases indicate some
 willingness to subordinate population equality to other political
 values. The proprietary government, boundary change, and extra-
 territoriality cases all suggest that interests other than population
 can be represented in local decisionmaking-economic interests in
 the proprietary setting, and deference to state-created territorial
 communities in the other cases. The Supreme Court has sought to
 avoid balancing the values of equal participation and community
 definition and preservation when they come into conflict by catego-
 rizing a case as presenting either an equal participation or a com-
 munity definition question (but not both at the same time), but
 the overlapping jurisdiction and extended franchise cases in the
 lower courts suggest the possibility of reconciling the two values
 without having one totally dominate the other.
 A federative regional government differs from the other local
 arrangements exempted from one person/one vote. Because it is
 unlikely that the burdens of the government would be borne by
 different subunits differently, the proprietary model is unavailable.
 Residents of subunits subject to the regional government would
 also, by definition, be residents of the region and, thus, the region
 would be the jurisdiction for the application of strict scrutiny to
 deviations from population equality. For regional governments
 with less than the full powers of a traditional municipality where
 291 See, for example, Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30 (1986).
 292 See Davis v Bandemer, 478 US 109 (1986).
 293 Lucas, 377 US at 753.
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 the other powers are exercised by the pre-existing local govern-
 ments, there might be some analogy to extraterritoriality and some
 claim to viewing the regional government as a state instrumental-
 ity rather than as a local government. Indeed, even residents of
 subunits getting less than their population's share of representa-
 tion in the regional government would be doing better than the
 residents of an extraterritorial zone because at least they would be
 getting some representation. Ultimately, however, the analogy fails
 because residents of the underrepresented subunits would be defi-
 nitionally residents of the region in the way that fringe area resi-
 dents were not residents of the core city.
 What is needed, then, is a new model of federative regional
 governments. Like the local self-government, proprietary, and state
 instrumentality models, the model of federative regional govern-
 ment would reflect some of the basic descriptive features and insti-
 tutional purposes of contemporary local governments. This model
 would be based on a recognition that increasingly metropolitan ar-
 eas are economically and ecologically intertwined and that many
 local regulatory and service delivery problems are regional in scope
 and cannot be adequately addressed by smaller political subdivi-
 sions. This model would also reflect the changes in the nature of
 proposals for regional structures away from fully consolidated mu-
 nicipalities of metropolitan scope, which would be difficult to dis-
 tinguish from other municipalities other than by size, toward
 multi-functional special districts designed to address those
 problems that require a regional focus while leaving pre-existing
 localities in place and in possession of many of their traditional
 powers. Moderating the stringency of one person/one vote for re-
 gional governments is less of a deviation from democratic norms if
 the regional entity does not have plenary local authority but sim-
 ply overlaps other local units. Limiting the model to entities of
 limited powers overlapping pre-existing autonomous local govern-
 ments would also be necessary in order to make a determinate dis-
 tinction between federative governments and the general purpose
 local governments subject to the full rigors of one person/one vote.
 Finally, the model would recognize that states could reasonably de-
 termine that regional governments might be politically less objec-
 tionable to local constituents and that the accountability of re-
 gional governments and the continuing efficacy of pre-existing local
 governments could be enhanced by basing representation at the re-
 gional level on local subunits.
 Unlike the other models of local government that have shaped
 federal constitutional protection of the local vote, the model of fed-
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 erative government would seek to reconcile population equality
 with the political and policy values of constituent local government
 representation, rather than subordinate one concern to the other.
 Smaller areas or incorporated subunits could be allowed to receive
 greater representation than population alone might warrant as an
 inducement to joining the regional entity. Similarly, greater devia-
 tions from population equality might be permitted than are cur-
 rently allowed in order to use local government borders as districts
 for election to the regional body. Bicameral regional institutions
 might be able to combine some modes of representation based on
 population with others based on local governments. The federative
 model might make it easier to use weighted voting because the
 claim that weighted voting fails to provide different districts with
 representation exactly proportional to population would be less
 compelling if population equality were not strictly required, al-
 though the difficulties inherent in assuring that weighted voting
 provides fair representation would remain.294
 Population would have to remain the baseline for evaluating
 the fairness of representation. Certainly the "systematic frustra-
 tion" of the interests of the regional majority would be inconsistent
 with any view of a regional government as a democratically self-
 governing community. But rather than assuring mathematical ex-
 actitude and a precise matching of population to voting power on
 the regional body, there should be greater deference to the state's
 accommodation of the conflict between population and the repre-
 sentation of constituent communities. By analogy to the overlap-
 ping jurisdiction and extended electorate cases, deviations from
 mathematical equality should be supported if they are justified by
 some substantial interest related to the creation or operation of the
 regional government and if neither a particular component locality
 nor the regional majority is denied the opportunity to play a signif-
 icant role in shaping the policies of the regional body.295
 A legal standard that seeks to reconcile the representation of
 local communities with the representation of population would un-
 doubtedly be more difficult to apply than one that gives primacy to
 either value. Certainly, one of the strengths of the one person/one
 vote test is its precision: for an elected body subject to one person/
 one vote it is easy to tell whether the representation scheme passes
 294 A "federative defense" sufficient to repel a constitutional one person/one vote chal-
 lenge might be inadequate to defend a weighted voting system against the claim that it
 dilutes the representation of minorities protected by the Voting Rights Act.
 295 See Section III.C.
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 muster. And precision, in turn, promotes ease of implementation
 and enforcement by lowering costs. But precision is achieved at the
 cost of accuracy. Population equality is not the only factor relevant
 to assessing the fairness of a representative scheme. As the local
 government voting jurisprudence indicates, the special purpose of
 the government, the policy judgment of the state, and the distinc-
 tive interests of autonomous political communities also contribute
 to the determination of the appropriate representative scheme for
 a particular locality. A model of federative government in which
 population and local communities both have a place could be
 doubly beneficial. As a practical matter it could facilitate the crea-
 tion of elective regional governments. And as a theoretical matter
 it could lead courts to deal more explicitly with the mix of con-
 cerns that go into measuring the fairness of representation.
 CONCLUSION
 The study of the one person/one vote doctrine at the local
 level consists of two interrelated projects: the examination of local
 government from the perspective of one person/one vote and, con-
 versely, the examination of one person/one vote from the perspec-
 tive of local government law. The first enterprise underscores the
 multiple roles and conceptions of local government in our legal and
 political structure while the second advances our understanding of
 the uncertainties in the conceptual underpinnings of our dominant
 theory of representation.
 To study local government through the prism of the one per-
 son/one vote doctrine is to find clearly displayed the three princi-
 pal models of local government extant in our legal culture-the
 "polis," the "firm" and the administrative arm of the state.29
 Much of the best contemporary legal scholarship concerning local
 governments has emphasized the view of local governments as "lit-
 tle republics"297 which can serve as fora for citizen deliberation and
 participation in public decisionmaking over a broad range of issues
 of community concern.298 Indeed, the initial application of the one
 person/one vote doctrine at the local level in the cases from Avery
 2" I have previously discussed the concepts of the "polis" and the "firm" in local gov-
 ernment law in Richard Briffault, Our Localism-Part II: Localism and Legal Theory, 90
 Colum L Rev 346, 392-435 (1990).
 297 The phrase is Thomas Jefferson's. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams
 (Oct 28, 1813), reprinted in L. Cappon, ed, II The Adams-Jefferson Letters 387, 390 (North
 Carolina, 1959).
 298 See, for example, Frug, 93 Harv L Rev 1057 (cited in note 3); Gillette, 86 Mich L
 Rev 930 (cited in note 174).
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 through Hadley relied upon and advanced the idea of local govern-
 ment as a miniature democratic polity. The Supreme Court's de-
 termination that the franchise and apportionment rules constitu-
 tive of democratic representative governments must also apply to
 local governments was premised on a view of localities as locally
 representative governments.
 Yet the Court's subsequent decisions comparably underscored
 the importance of the other roles, and other models, of local gov-
 ernment. The special purpose district cases articulate a view of lo-
 cal governments as quasi-proprietary entities-landowner-con-
 trolled vehicles for financing the development and operation of
 infrastructure that enhances the value of property. These cases
 point to the historic economic functions, and economic constituen-
 cies, of local governments. They also remind us that
 many-indeed, most-local governments in the United States are
 not states-in-miniature, possessing broad decisionmaking authority
 over an array of public services and issues, but are instead highly
 specialized bodies, with powers narrowly limited to one or a few
 service delivery functions. In that sense, the special district cases
 can also be seen as a special instance of the continuing power of
 the traditional state instrumentality model. Local governments are
 not simply representatives of local constituencies but also function
 as agents of the states, charged with delivering public services and
 discharging state police power responsibilities locally. In shaping
 one person/one vote to protect the state's decisions concerning lo-
 cal extraterritorial authority, the allocation of the franchise and
 the aggregation of votes in local government boundary change elec-
 tions, and the extension of the franchise beyond the core local elec-
 torate, the case law reflects the continuing power of the state in-
 strumentality model.
 Ironically, although the one person/one vote cases reveal the
 multiple functions and conceptions of local government, doctrine
 in this area tends to obscure the fact that the same governments
 may combine two or all three of these roles. Infrastructure financ-
 ing districts have political effects and serve proprietary functions,
 much as extraterritoriality involves both local representation and
 state administration. Yet the case law has denied this simultaneity
 of function and, instead, has sought to categorize a particular local
 institution or election as involving just one model of local govern-
 ment, without acknowledging the implications for other aspects of
 local government that do not fall within that model.
 The tendency toward categorization is understandable, how-
 ever, given the absolutist nature of the one person/one vote doc-
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 trine. As cases like Kramer and Hadley indicate, once an election
 or an institution is deemed political, strict scrutiny of departures
 from the one person/one vote rule follows. In the local democracy
 setting, the proprietary or state administrative elements of general
 purpose governments are also largely ignored. It would have been
 difficult to preserve longstanding local arrangements like special
 purpose districts and extraterritoriality if their local political as-
 pects had been acknowledged, as the departures from one person/
 one vote could hardly have survived strict scrutiny. The preserva-
 tion of these traditional local institutions would require either that
 one person/one vote be tempered by concerns in addition to popu-
 lation equality, or that categorical exemptions from the rigors of
 the strict doctrine be created. The Court took the latter approach.
 These local arrangements were, in effect, depoliticized, and their
 voting and apportionment rules were held to have no implications
 for local popular representation in local governance.
 As the preceding discussion illustrates, this Article's second
 project, the examination of the one person/one vote doctrine
 through the prism of local government, is closely related to the
 first. The local government cases highlight the uncertainties in the
 theory of representation that undergirds the Court's doctrine in
 the area of voting and apportionment. The extension of the local
 vote to all otherwise eligible voters and the requirement of equally
 weighted votes grow out of the presumption that all members of
 the community interested in or affected by an election or a govern-
 ment have an equal right to participation in the election or the
 selection of representatives in that government.
 The unstated premise in the argument that interest or impact
 implies participation is that all those interested or affected are in-
 terested or affected to a comparable degree. But what if a govern-
 ment has disparate degrees of impact on different members of the
 community? The question may be sidestepped at the national or
 state level; the extensive legislative, regulatory, and fiscal powers of
 these governments support the inference that government action
 has pervasive effects for all constituents throughout the jurisdic-
 tion. The significance of disparities in government impact is more
 sharply presented at the local level where overlapping jurisdictions
 and special purpose governments create situations in which differ-
 ent members of a community are, indeed, differently affected by a
 particular local government's action.
 The courts have dealt with disparities in local government im-
 pact by, for the most part, giving enormous weight to territorial
 boundary lines and the categorical distinction between general and
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 special limited purpose governments. The judicial approach has
 been dichotomous, assuming, often somewhat disingenously, that
 either all constituents are comparably affected by a local govern-
 ment or that those less affected by the government are actually not
 affected at all. Thus, the relationship so central to the theory of
 representation between difference in impact and the provision of
 representation was never directly addressed.
 The interplay of one person/one vote and the dominant mod-
 els of local government also contributes to an understanding of the
 place, or, rather, the absence of a place, for federative regional gov-
 ernments in current local government law, while raising anew the
 issue of the role of population equality in measuring fair represen-
 tation. The lack of an exemption from the rigors of one person/one
 vote for regional governments points up both the lack of a model
 of federative regional governments in the traditional thinking
 about local governments and the displacement of territorial factors
 by population in the contemporary definition of representation.
 "Political" local governments-that is, those with some general
 governmental powers and designed to be accountable to local elec-
 torates-are generally considered to be unitary, rather than federa-
 tions of other, smaller localities. Local governments have long been
 of regional scope, due to initial incorporation, annexation, or con-
 solidation of pre-existing local units, but our legal system's experi-
 ence with federative regional units, is relatively limited and gener-
 ally recent. Yet surely there is a growing need to develop new
 models of regional government which would preserve autonomy for
 existing smaller units and also create larger political structures ca-
 pable of addressing metropolitan land use, transportation, housing,
 and environmental needs and remedying the damaging conse-
 quences of worsening city-suburb economic inequalities and social
 disparities.299 Federative local governments may be necessary to
 meet that need.
 A federative model of local government would also force fur-
 ther examination of our current basic assumption that fair repre-
 sentation means equal population representation. Federative gov-
 ernments give distinct representation to pre-existing component
 governments, but the one person/one vote doctrine makes popula-
 tion equality the touchstone of representation and relegates the
 representation of political subdivisions to no more than marginal
 299 See generally David Rusk, Cities Without Suburbs (Johns Hopkins, 1993) (attribut-
 ing contemporary urban woes to the loss of middle class residents and tax base to suburbs
 and urging, inter alia, measures that would create metropolitan jurisdictions).
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 18:56:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1993] One Person/One Vote 423
 status. As cases like Hadley and Board of Estimate suggest, feder-
 ative governments with more than minimal departures from popu-
 lation equality could not survive the current one person/one vote
 rule. One person/one vote would, thus, appear to doom the federa-
 tive model. However, as I suggested at the end of Part IV, federal
 regional governments might actually provide the opportunity for
 reconsidering Justice Stewart's contention three decades ago that
 fair representation can encompass other political factors at odds
 with strict population equality.
 The equation of fair representation and population equality is
 an artifact of our constitutional history. The Supreme Court ad-
 dressed the respective roles of population equality and the repre-
 sentation of political subdivisions in litigation concerning the mas-
 sive and longstanding overrepresentation of rural areas. In the one
 person/one vote cases of the 1960s, representation of territory
 seemed no more than a guise for the preservation of the political
 power of a particular group. The strict formulation of one person/
 one vote was instrumentally necessary to break the anachronistic
 hold of rural interests on the government of an increasingly urban
 nation.300
 The issue might be resolved differently if posed in the setting
 of new forms of metropolitan government created expressly to deal
 with contemporary economic problems and social conflicts of re-
 gional scope. Governance structures that combine representation
 of regional population majorities with extra attention to the inter-
 ests of component local governments-and, concomitantly depart
 from pure equal population representation-might not be seen as
 inherently negating fair representation but rather as part of the
 complex process of reconciling the competing roles of population,
 pre-existing communities, economic and social interests, and state
 political and policy preferences.
 The application of the one person/one vote requirement to the
 political, proprietary, and administrative conceptions of local gov-
 ernment raised questions concerning the relationship between the
 impact of or interest in government action and the right to equal
 representation in that government. So, too, the development of
 federative regional governments would provide an occasion for
 testing whether the one person/one vote rule is itself an essential
 requisite of fair representation or, rather, whether states may be
 allowed to modify the role of population equality to "achieve the
 300 See, for example, Bernard Grofman, Voting Rights, Voting Wrongs: The Legacy of
 Baker v. Carr 3-4 (Twentieth Century Fund, 1990).
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 important goal of ensuring a fair, effective, and balanced represen-
 tation of [ ] regional, social and economic interests."30'
 301 Lucas v Forty-fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 US 713, 751 (Stewart
 dissenting).
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